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Introduction
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) brought attention to a new threat
arising from the misuse of radioactive sources at the International IAEA Board
conference held in London in 2005: nowadays seems that illicit trafficking of
radioactive sources is mostly linked to malicious use in terroristic attacks rather
than to a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty [1]. The terroristic attack to
the Twin Towers on September 11th 2001 revealed that non-state actors have no
qualm in using the most brutal means to spread panic in their attacks against
the population. Since the use of radioactive sources is nowadays applied in all
fields of technology as well as medicine, well logging, γ radiography for pipeline
structures and damage control, it is mandatory to build a strong control structure
to prevent sources from being stolen or illicitly dismissed since those are the ones
that may enter the black market. The awareness about this risk pushed companies,
researchers and policymakers to study different solutions, concerning the standard
fixed checkpoints at borders used to detect illicit trafficked sources. The solution
commonly believed to be the most promising is a diffuse monitoring system made
out of many small detectors configured as a smart grid. In this scenario, detectors
are placed in fixed points next to sensitive objectives or given to police officers, taxi
and bus drivers, letter carriers, to move those detectors around the city continuously.
This approach results in the creation of a smart grid of sensors capable of detecting
small quantities of radioactive material and lessening the possibility for a smuggler
to avoid a checkpoint. The main challenge is to build small devices which maintain
sensitivity to the radiation of interest, either γ or neutron. On the market, existing
tools that are based on two detectors, specific for each kind radiation, to meet the
sensitivity criteria outlined by the IAEA, European and ANSI standards. In the last
decades, the interest for novel engineered scintillators that are sensitive to both
γ and neutron radiation has increased, as outlined in the European Commission
document about the novel technology that will help as countermeasures for nuclear
risks [2]. In particular scintillators sensitive to γ and neutrons with pulse shape
that depends on ionisation density, thus on the interacting particle, are of particular
interest since they will allow increasing the performances of small detectors by
increasing their active volume without changing the detector dimension, a feature
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particularly useful in the case of neutron detection. However, any new detector
must be capable of performing on-line discrimination of the impinging particle to be
compliant with the IAEA prescriptions.
The main goal of the thesis was the understanding of how an instrument affects
the reconstruction of the signal shape. It will be shown how the efficiency in light
collection as well as the Silicon Photomultiplier and electronic readout transfer
function affects the capability of γ neutron discrimination capable scintillator.
Silicon Photomultipliers are state of the art light detectors, with single-photon
sensitivity, high dynamic range, robustness, low cost and low power consumption.
These sensors have a low bias voltage, below 100V, that make them suitable for
a small and portable battery-operated detector. However, Silicon Photomultipliers
generally have a large capacitance that strongly impacts the signal shape, and so far
their successful use in Pulse Shape Discrimination has never been apparent. Indeed
whole acquisition chain must preserve the information contained in the scintillating
light profile and, for a field-usable instrument, the signal processing has to be done
on-line for particle discrimination and subsequent alarm triggering.
The thesis is the results of two joint research projects: a first one aimed to engineer
an instrument for diffuse monitoring based on a digital signal processing, and a
second one aimed to characterise an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
for nuclear security applications.
The whole study about the impact of digital electronics was part of the joint research
project with a UK based company called Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE). The
main deliverable of the project was the customisation of an instrument for the diffuse
monitoring. In order to deliver such instrument required by the project committee,
research focused on discrimination capabilities of a digital electronics system that
led to the customisation of the I-Spector, a device designed by Nuclear Instruments
Srl and commercialised by CAEN spa. The custom version of the devices embeds a
digitiser and a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that performs the on-line
particle identification. Control software that allows to calibrate the system and set
alarms if the radiation level overcomes a certain threshold was commissioned as part
of the research. In particular, the performances in terms of discrimination capabilities
of the on-line procedure were tested against a standard and well settled off-line
analysis procedure. In the thesis, procedures to define minimum requirements,
tests on the systems, including the commissioning of the final deliverable, will be
presented.
On the other hand, a joint research project with Kromek Group plc was the framework
in which the analogue pulse shape discrimination was studied and compared to the
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digital approach. The focus of this project was the characterisation of ASIC called
APOLLO, produced by Kromek. The ASIC was characterised and tested for on-line
Pulse Shape Discrimination using an evaluation board that allows accessing to all
the channels and the functionality of the ASIC.
The thesis is structured to give, in its initial chapters, common basis about law and
scientific frameworks for nuclear security. After the analysis of the bibliography, the
scientific work moves towards the understanding of the mechanism underneath dif-
ferent Pulse Shape Discrimination Algorithms. As a results new algorithm, that better
performs with SiPM concerning the standard techniques practised with Photomulti-
pliers tubes, have been defined. Moreover, a full chapter (Chapter 3) is dedicated to
a review of the Silicon Photomultipliers technology. A significant portion of the thesis
(Chapter 4 and 5) have been dedicated to the analysis of noise and light collection
impact in Pulse Shape Discrimination. By the end of this sections, it will result
clear why the new algorithm for pulse shape discrimination, defined as the ratio
between the integral of the falling edge of the signal and the signal amplitude, better
performed with respect the standard ones. In these Chapters, both experiments and
numerical simulation were used to understand the measured phenomena. Indeed,
the last two chapters of the thesis (Chapters 7 and 8) are focused on measurements
edit to understand how either a digital or an analogue signal processing circuit
performs in on-line pulse shape discrimination. A set of preliminary measurements
were aimed to quantify the effect of signal shaping, bit resolution and different
sampling rate impact on discrimination in order to set the minimum requirement
for the digital system, in particular, the ADC bit resolution and sampling frequency
concerning the shaping of the Front End Electronics. Performances of the analogue
pulse shape discrimination circuits were investigated using the APOLLO ASIC by
Kromek. The ASIC has 16 input channels, and it embeds both an analogue integrator
and a "peak and hold" circuits, that allows implementing Pulse Shape Discrimination
algorithm on-line. It was initially characterised, from a test board that gives full
access to the 16 channels, in its linearity and working range. From the qualification
board, however, it was only possible to dump the measured quantity to build up the
discrimination parameters. The discrimination was performed off-line, but a near-
real-time procedure implemented on actual instruments that make use of APOLLO
ASIC should not behave differently from the presented results.
3
1Nuclear Security
After its discovery, and an initial usage without regulations, radioactivity posed
severe concerns to health while used for industrial, military or medical applications.
The first concerns arose after the X-ray discovery, since some patients showed the
symptoms of Radiation-Induced Diseases (RIDs). Even though the discovery of
Radium self-activity and the possibility to split a Uranium atom to allow a self-
sustained chain reaction opened the way to new technologies, like nuclear reactors,
the awareness about the risk of those technologies increased at last. The belief that
a peaceful and regulated use of radioactivity would be more than beneficial was
stronger and stronger due to the proved benefits as, for example, cancer treatment.
After the terrible events inC Hiroshima and Nagasaki the "Cold War", as George
Orwell defined the arms race between USA and USSR, led to the signature of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). NPT was sponsored by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) the international organisation that aims to promote the
peaceful use of atoms and atomic energy.
The events of 9/11 started a new era of nuclear threats since non-state actors or
terrorist organisations, like Al-Qaeda, actively tried to acquire nuclear or radioactive
material for a wilful malicious act[3]. In this chapter, after a brief historical recall of
milestones in radioprotection, a focus on the risk scenarios recognised by Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and relevant regulatory laws that are in use
worldwide will be outlined. The analysis of the IAEA documents containing a review
of the major accidents and threats will guide the discussion toward the definition of
instruments and procedure for the detection of illicit activity related to nuclear or
radioactive material (NRM).
1.1 The roots of Nuclear Security
In late 1895 W.K. Röntgen discovered the X-Rays. The potentiality of its discovery,
well above the curiosity-driven breakthrough, was promptly evident in the medical
field, indeed yet from 1896 X-Ray machines have been used in hospitals to get
internal images of injured body, helping in diagnosing and surgery processes [4].
Just one year after X-Rays, A. H. Becquerel discovered the radioactivity in Uranium
(1896) while Elihu Thomson conducted experiments to understand better whether
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there was any damage caused by the use of X-Ray. People that used Röntgen rays
daily suffered from burns, hair loss and other side effects [5]. The γ rays discovered
by Pierre and Marie Curie while studying Radium in 1898 was proved to be more
penetrating than X-Rays in 1900 by P. U. Villard. The next year, 1901 while Roentgen
was awarded the Nobel Prize, it was confirmed by W.H. Rolling that the X-Rays
were lethal to mammals, and a few years later, when Becquerel and the Curies won
their Nobel Prize (1903), it was proven that X and γ rays could induce damage
into the body [6, 7]. However, in the very same year, a study was published by G.
Perthes that confirmed X-Rays inhibit the tumorous cell multiplication [8]. In the
following years, medical and industrial breakthroughs were indisputable, as much
as the proofs that radiation can cause leukaemia, cancers or other possibly lethal
side effects, for example, the death of a patient treated with 226Ra injection, who
suffered from Arthritis. In 1915 the British Röntgen Society proposed a regulation
for the protection of those workers that used radioactive in their daily activity.
The regulatory action was still in its larval stage, that is why, in 1922, the first
worker (a woman called Amelia Maggia) died after prolonged exposure to 226Ra in
radioactive painting for dials. A few years later, in 1930, C. Lauritsen proposed its
first radiotherapy machine. Despite the benefits that radiation was bringing into the
world, poor knowledge of its side-effects caused many deaths; to remember the 169
physicians and technician that died from radiation-induced diseases who sacrificed
their lives for the knowledge and the benefit of the humankind, in 1936 the city of
Hamburg placed the first memorial [9].
With a jump of more than ten years, while in Los Alamos scientist involved in the
Manhattan project were trying to build the Nuclear Weapon after the discovery of the
mechanism for the self-sustained chain reaction in Uranium (1938 by Otto Hahn),
the U.S. Committee on X-Ray protection published the first regulation in terms of
radiation protection. This regulation limited the Radium quantity for body injection
at 0.1 µCi, and a note posted by L.S. Taylor recommended to use "less than 0.02
Roentgen/day of X-ray radiation to lower the probability of RID".
In 1942, while Fermi operated the first nuclear reactor in Chichago, it was shown
that a dose of 4 Roentgen/day was lethal to humans, and a year later the toxicology
study on Uranium was started [9]. The terrible explosion of Little Boy and Fat
Man, the two atomic weapons dropped on Hiroshima e Nagasaki on 6th and 9th
of August 1945 triggered not only a profound shock for the consciousness of all
humankind but also the research on the biological effect of large scale radiation
exposure after an explosion or a fallout. Indeed, as the years go by, the American
Public Health Association pointed out in a report dated back to 1956 that the primary
concern for the citizens would have been the pacific use of radioactivity since those
applications would have generated more chemicals and radioactive waste dispersion
in the environment proven to be a significant hazard for the heath.
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In the 1960s USA and USSR begun a negotiation about the nuclear weapons, to
reduce the amount of objects1 retained by both countries since the cost of the army
race and maintenance cost was not worth to increase the security level [11]. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was open for signature from 1968, and its incipit
and the ratio underneath the treaty:
"Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all humankind by a nuclear
war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and
to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Believing that the proliferation of
nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war, In conformity
with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an
agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Undertaking
to co-operate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities [The Signing States agrees that]"
Non Proliferation Treaty, 1968
After NPT was signed only the five countries that developed a nuclear weapon before
1970, namely USA, USSR, UK, France and the Popular Republic of China, could
maintain the nuclear weapons, but they were forced to reduce the total number.
Several other treaties were signed after that first one, like the STAR I and START
II aimed to reduce the ability to fire nuclear bombs all over the world hoping to
increase the security across the globe.
Since its foundation, IAEA not only was the institution in charge of control the
decommissioning of nukes but also promoted the peaceful use of atomic energy
and defines the procedure to reduce risks that come from the misuse of radioactive
sources.
Along with the unaware exposure of citizens due to the source illicitly abandoned
or dismissed, the so-called orphan sources, after the terrorist attack to the Twin
Towers in New York, 9/11 2001, IAEA registered an increased risk linked to the will
of non-state actors in the acquisition of nuclear or radioactive source for a malicious
act. The warning was, and still is, entirely factual since Al-Qaeda proved to be
not afraid in using most disrupting arms to damage and spread panic [12]. Since
the illicit trafficking, theft, sale, delivery, usage, disposal, transfer or possession of
nuclear material could lead not only to proliferation of atomic weapons but also to
the construction of devices to spread radioactivity in terroristic attacks, nowadays
instruments, protocols and international regulatory regimes are adopted to guarantee
the highest level of security [12, 13].
1Nuclear weapons are often called, in official documents "nuke" or "object" or "gadget" [10]
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1.2 Incident with nuclear and radioactive material
The technology advancement that we experienced in the last century did not leave
behind the use of Radioactive sources in the most different fields. Military, as
well as civil application, have been exploited since the scientific discoveries made
the use of radioactive source safer. However, if not appropriately controlled, such
materials could represent a significant source of risk, so far not only nuclear but
also radioactive materials undergo a Regulatory Control by IAEA, called Safeguards.
Safeguards consist in procedures, instruments, tools and periodic controls to certify
nature and use of such material to be pacific and safe, and that quantity of such
material, useful for a malicious act, is not theft or loss. The word "incident", in the
IAEA standards, does not refer to explosions or fallout, but to the discovery of illicit
trafficking, theft lost of orphan sources [14].
In nuclear security, there is a clear difference between radioactive and nuclear
material [15].
Radioactive materials are all those isotopes that emit ionising radiation. This class is
comprehensive of all radioactive source used in civil and military application. To
this class belong, for example, 137Cs, 22Na, 131I, 60Co, 90Sr to cite the most used
ones [13, 15].
The nuclear material is a special class of radioactive material. In particular, it is
referred to any special fissile material, like 239Pu,233U and Uranium enriched with
the isotope 235U and 233U , or other materials that may trigger a self-sustained decay
chain. Nuclear power plans or nuclear weapons make use of those sources. Those
materials are also called Highly Enriched Uranium or Weapon Grade Plutonium
(HEU/WGP). For example, the difference between occurring natural Uranium and
HEU is the percentage of isotope 235U , that naturally occurs in the more stable 238U
only as 1/140. At the same time, it is enriched to more than 20% in the nuclear
weapon useful material [10]. The actual composition of nukes in terms of Uranium
or Plutonium isotope enrichment, tamper and construction details are, of course,
classified. Still, some models exist, and they can be used to guess the energy and
flux of expected neutron and γ spectra and activity [16].
• HEU : 234U 1%, 235U 93%, 238U 6%;
• WGP : 239Pu 93%, 240Pu 6%.
Special nuclear material isotope composition according to the model reported in [16]
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1.2.1 IAEA source classification
Sources are classified according to the threat level they poses. IAEA summarise this
information in quantity called activity ratio A/D. It takes into account not only the
intrinsic source activity, but its size to determine the actual risk they can pose to
population.
The activity of a radioactive source, A, is defined as the number of decay per second
and it does not account for the kind and multiplicity of particle or radiation emitted
by the decaying nuclei. Activity is measured either in Becquerel (Bq), namely the
total number of disintegration per second in a given sample, or in Curie (Ci), namely
the equivalent activity of 1g of 226Ra; the conversion between Ci and Bq is expressed
in(1.1).
1Ci = 37GBq (1.1)
The normalised activity D is a value that established for each radioisotope repre-
senting a threshold of danger, which takes into account the typer and the energy of
the emitted radiation. In this sense, the quantity called Activity Ratio A/D acts as a
quantitative parameter to assess sources based upon the level of risk they trigger.
The IAEA source classification, reported in Table 1.1 is based on this quantity [17].
Category A/D Source Usage
1 ≥ 1000
Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) Irradiators
Tele-therapy sources
Fixed, multi-beam teletherapy (gamma knife) sources
2 [10, 1000] Industrial gamma radiography sources
High/medium dose rate brachytherapy sources
3 [1, 10] Fixed industrial gauges that incorporate high activity sources
Well logging gauges
4 [0.01, 1]
Low dose rate brachytherapy sources




Permanent low dose rate medical sources
X ray fluorescence (XRF) devices
Electron capture devices
Mossbauer spectrometry sources
Positron emission tomography (PET) check sources
Tab. 1.1: IAEA classification of radioactive source based on the normalised activity ratio
A/D as reported in [17].
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1.2.2 Incident and Trafficking Database
The planning of countermeasures to contain the nuclear risk is based on the research
and tracking of significant incidents related to the trafficking and the discovery of
sources that should be under the regulatory control as reported by member states.
Records of those events are collected in the Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)
that helps in the definition of the threats to be addressed in the Nuclear Security
Plans from 1995. The full record of events is not accessible since the confidentiality
of the shared information act both as an incentive to the cooperation of member
states and as a preventive measure against leakage of critical information to pursue
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it is clear from the documents
that intelligence services most likely control the non-proliferation of atomic weapons
by a member state. The events collected in the database, from the fact-sheet where
aggregated data are disseminated as informative service to the population and
policymakers, shows that in the last 20 years the focus should be more on the misuse
of radioactivity by non-state actors rather than an institutional one. Indeed only a
few incidents are reported as linked to the quantity of HEU or WGP that could be
used to build a nuclear weapon. Most of the events are related to other criminal
offences that would have exposed population to radiation if not detected.
In the ITDB the events are classified according to these groups:
• Group I: Events connected, or very likely connected, to the trafficking of
radioactive and nuclear material for malicious use.
• Group II: Events of trafficking whose final use is unknown. It may be both a
malicious use or the unlawful disposal of sources.
• Group III: Events that are not, at least very unlikely, linked with terrorist
purposes even though they caused an unjustified exposure of subjects (worker,
or citizens) to radiation.
The ITDB records incidents that happened since 1993: a total of 3497 entries were
reported as of 31th of December 2018, 253 of which in the sole 2018 among 49
States, indicating that the unauthorised activities involving trafficking and malicious
use are far from unlikely to happen [14]. A total of 285 events, since 1993, were
in the group I, indeed proven after police investigation to be linked with the wilful
terrorist-driven malicious act. Almost 1000 recorded events were recorded with
too few information to determine whether they were addressed to terrorism, and
more than 2200 cases were related to unlawful disposal of nuclear material or other
non-terrorist purposes.
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Even though the events in the Group I never exceed the 20 occurrences per year
(Figure 1.1), the number is enough to justify the security procedure at borders to look
for the radioactive source and international cooperation of Intelligence Agencies. In
this group, scam and fraud are reported as well, since their first buyers are on the
black market are terrorist organisations.
Fig. 1.1: Number of reported incident per year since 1993 up to 2018 in Group I, from [14]
Luckily only a few of them, the ITDB fact sheet does not report the exact number,
involved significant quantity, in the order of 25 kilograms for HEU and of 8 kilograms
for WGP (Figure 1.2) [15]. However, from the few information obtained by the
ITDB or other available disclosed sources, the number of successful transaction of
nuclear materials on the black market is not known. Most of the illicit trafficking is
discovered at borders where the detection pass trough the Radiation Portal Monitors
(RPM). The RPMs are big detectors used to scan lorries and containers at major
commercial hubs and border. Working principle of the RMS will be discussed later
on in Section 1.3.2.
Group II: to this group belongs all that incidents that includes stole or missing
material for which no enough information is available to determine the end-use of
the missing material. Those events are of great importance in the Nuclear Security
Plan since they highlight vulnerability in the nuclear or radioactive material storage
or the transport procedure. A small number of events in this group regard the
discovery of illicit possession of radioactive material from the industrial users that
bypassed controls to reduce the management cost of sources; those are high-risk
events since sources outside the regulatory control or illicitly possessed are most
likely to be trafficked on the black market after the disposal. To contain the number
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Fig. 1.2: An example of HEU source found in 1999 in Bulgaria in routines border controls
[15]. In (a) is the package as it was found, (b) is a detail of the moderator and
shielding and the (c) is the HEU source itself.
of those incidents, mostly constant in the past 20 years as shown in Figure 1.3,
most of the security relies on procedures and protocols to make more and more
complicated the operation outside safeguards and Agency controls.
Fig. 1.3: Number of reported incident per year since 1993 up to 2018 in Group II, from
[14]. The spike in 2006 is due to a change in reporting procedure, and do not
represent a real increase of incident linked to that year.
Primary trafficked sources come from industrial applications where they are used
for non-destructive test or medical imaging since those sources are perceived as of
great value on the black market. These groups also include highly enriched Uranium
and plutonium, and plutonium neutron sources. Sources up to the Category 2
of the IAEA source classification (Section 1.2.1) enter this group, with significant
attention to sources in the Category 2-3, that has a dedicated follow-up procedure
to guarantee that the missing sources are found and then disposed within the
safeguards prescription. Sources in the category 4-5 do not represent significant
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hazard, so they do not undergo a dedicated follow-up procedure. Most of them are
related to short-living radioisotopes that will not cause harm even if released in the
environment.
The Group III comprises all incidents that are not linked to any malicious act. Those
events regard both unauthorised detection of material for industrial application
or the discovery of sources illicitly disposed and released in the environment, the
so-called orphan sources. Another not negligible amount of incidents regard the
unaware shipment of a radioactive source, mainly within metal scrap. Events of this
kind are again an indication of an ineffective procedure to control the radioactive
sources. The diffusion of RPM after the 9/11 events, not only at border but also at
metal scrap working facilities gates causes an increase of the detected contaminated
scrap or unaware shipmen, as indicated in Figure 1.4 by the increase of such incidents
after 2001.
Fig. 1.4: Number of reported incident per year since 1993 up to 2018 in Group III, from
[14]
Those incidents are linked to the unnecessary or unaware exposure of citizens
and worker to radiation, more than to the risk for a malicious act. The harm is
not negligible even in Italy: from a report by Agenzia Regionale per la Protezione
Ambientale - ARPA, the Italian regional environmental protection agency, recorded
more than 260 records of contaminated scrap from 150 firms between 1997 and
2000 in just a province of Lombardy, Brescia, but they were not all recorded in ITDB
since they involved sources in Category 5 [18]. Those pieces of information are any
way useful to understand the weak point in the safeguards chain, and help in the
definition of more strict countermeasures.
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Another useful source of information to evaluate the danger and the effects of actual
incidents caused by the misuse of radioactive and nuclear material or by failure in
security systems is the Johnston Archive [19]. It is a website, cited among the other
by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist [20], that collects data about the injury and
fatalities directly caused by radiation incidents. Apart from the war use at the end of
World War II, and from incident directly involving nuclear power reactors, the total
number of fatalities is more than 200 with more than 1500 people directly injured
from 1986 to 2008 in the significant reported events.
1.3 Malicious Act: Threats and countermeasures
It was possible to evaluate the major threats the world could face due to a malicious
act of non-state actors in possession of nuclear or radioactive material thanks to the
information gathered from the ITDB. The risks reported in the document produced
by The International Conference of London, held by the IAEA board in 2005 [1]:
"The threats involve criminal or terrorist acquiring and using for malicious purposes:
(a) nuclear explosive device;
(b) nuclear material to build an improvised nuclear explosive device IND;
(C) radioactive material to construct a radiation dispersal device (RDD); and/or
(d) the dispersal of radioactivity trough sabotage or installation in which nuclear and
other radioactive material can be found or of such material in transport."
From the reports outlined in that conference appears clear how, if the non-proliferation
is mostly guarantee by deterrence and intelligence to control if independent states
do not violate the treaty, a significant risk from the population comes from non-
state actors that would move small quantity of radioactive material with the main
goal to spread terror instead of an efficient damage. The approach to the various
threats should take into consideration the different type of radionuclide and tech-
nology and in which measure they are accessible to different criminals and criminal
organisations. In the last decade IAEA recognised that:
Advanced in information technology and the availability of radioactive material have
increased the likelihood that a terrorist or other criminal organisation could obtain not
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only the necessary material but also the components and the expertise to construct an
IND or RDD [15]
Apart from sabotage, that would require a physical, possibly military, protection
[21], RDD and improvised nuclear bombs are the most substantial threats. The most
effective RDD called "Dirty Bombs" would combine nuclear or radioactive material,
mainly sources outside regulatory control (orphan source, lost or thief material),
with conventional explosive that, when detonated, contaminates persons, properties
and environment. Non-explosive means can also be used to spread radiation, for
example just leaving a source on a means of public transport or by sabotage of water
pipelines. Effective countermeasures against RDD should focus on sources capable of
long-lasting damage or contamination. Luckily, even if a lot of different radioactive
materials are used in for an industrial, medical and civil application, only a few of
them would cause serious prompt damage or a long-lasting contamination [13].
Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, are addressed to a different purpose. Although
there were only two usages of nuclear bombs against the population, August 1945
in Japan, the direct threat is caused by the proliferation of such devices other than
the mass killing. Illicit use of nuclear material for nuclear weapons occurs when a
state acquires nuclear material to build proper nuclear weapons outside the NPT like
North Korea did in last few years, but also because non-state actors try to build the
so-called Improvised Nuclear Devices. The risk of the first scenario is a war at global
level, but the discovery of such threat is, in most of the case, directly disclosed from
the country who de-legitimate the treaty, since the possession of a nuclear weapon
would place the country on a higher level on the political chessboard. It is however
unlikely that such country would use for real such weapon. In the second case, the
risk for the population is more factual: if the terrorist does not appropriately treat
the Nuclear Material, it may cause exposure and damage of population while the
bomb is in construction, not to mention the damage caused by an unforeseen or
wilful explosion [15] that a non-state actor would purse since a different motivation
aims it.
States signed several multilateral treaties that impose technological, regulatory laws,
code of conduct for exporters or buyers of nuclear material at a national level in
order to contain those risks.
1.3.1 International Treaties
Nuclear security is, of course, a matter of national law, but all the governments
agree that the effectiveness of the implemented countermeasures is beneficial only
if shared and adopted by the broadest possible number of countries [15]. The
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international treaty does not only deal with nuclear non-proliferation, but also with
radiation protection, physical and military protection of sites and power plants,
transportation of nuclear and radioactive material and emergency assistance. On the
non-proliferation side, treaties define commercial relationships among the states to
facilitate pacific use of atomic energy and to discourage the proliferation of nuclear
weapons trough controls and sanctions, establishing rights and duty on many aspects
related to the commercialisation of nuclear material and knowledge. The IAEA
published a comprehensive manual of the in-force international law: Handbook on
Nuclear Law [22]. It is worth to mention that enormous effort has been pursued by
the States to achieve and effectively adopt the following multilateral initiative:
1. Non Proliferation Treaty - 1970 [23];
2. NPT Exporters Committee - Zangger Committee Guidelines [24];
3. Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines [25];
4. Regional Nuclear Non-Proliferation and arms control Treaties[26, 27, 28, 29];
5. IAEA safeguards agreement and protocols [30, 31];
6. Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) 1980[32,
33];
7. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (CENNA) 1986 [34];
8. Europool Convention 1999 [35];
9. Convention on suppress AcT of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 [36];
10. Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources [37];
11. Guidance on the import and export of radioactive sources [38];
12. United Nation Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1540 and 1373[39, 40].
Among those, the most important is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was open
for signature in 1968, and 1970 it became effective. In 1995 all the Signing States
agreed to extend it indefinitely. The main features of the NPT are stated in the first
three articles. In Article I the five countries that possessed a nuclear weapon at the
time of treaty signature, namely USA, USSR, UK, France and the Popular Republic
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of China, agree to not transfer or sell any nuclear weapon to any other country. In
Article II, on the other side, the non-nuclear states agree not to receive or try to buy
any nuclear warhead, nor to invest in research and development of nuclear weapons.
In Article III all the countries necessarily agrees with the safeguard regime imposed
by the IAEA. To reinforce this treaty, the Zangger Committee Guidelines and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines imposes other strict conditions to the nuclear
and radioactive material producer about the export and the selling strategies. Even
from the multilateral initiative history, it is possible to see how the states moved from
the stop of nuclear proliferation to measures that would guarantee the protection
of radioactive sources to inhibit acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as outlined in the IAEA
London Conference held in 2005.
Following this trend, the main topic of this thesis would focus on the study of
materials and method that could be of interest for source identification and illicit
trafficking control field.
1.3.2 Radiation Detectors for Nuclear Security
In the IAEA guidelines for the tools against the illicit trafficking and usage of nuclear
or radioactive material in Radiological Dispersal Devices identifies two classes of
instruments: Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) addressed to fixed checkpoints and
hand-held or personal instruments for patrols and officer, like Personal Radiation
Detectors (PRDs), Hand-held γ and neutron search detectors (GSDs and NSDs) and
Hand Held Radio-Isotopes Identification Devices (RIIDs) [15]. More sophisticated
laboratory equipment that would be used in the forensics or the academic research
is not of interest since it requires specific training and competences to be used
successfully, and they do not give real-time alarms. At the same time, the mentioned
devices can be operated with just a little training of the operators to obtain real-time
alarms. The instruments for the detection of illicit material are not only intended to
prevent any injury or damage to people, properties and environment but also they
are used to assay the source to use the gathered information in the legal proceeding
against who was committing the criminal offence. Nuclear material differs from
NORMS in the typical γ and neutron fluence, being more intense in one with respect
to the other. It is common for illicit traffickers to mask N.R. material with other
NORM. All the detectors must take in account the environment radiation background,
so they are usually calibrated to trigger an alarm only of the radiation level is higher
than four standard deviations with respect to the background [15, 41, 42]. This
general prescription for the threshold is then adjusted to reduce the false alarm due
to background fluctuation, but still, one alarm per day can be anticipated. All the
instruments must meet some sensibility criteria. For the γ it is required that at 0.2
µSv/h background, a dose rate increase of 0.1 µSv/h is detected within 1 second. For
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neutron detectors, a general prescription reported in [43] states that "It is required
that a neutron detector for homeland security application not produce any neutron
alarm when exposed to a 10mR/H γ-ray exposure rate during 106 measurements,
while still meeting the neutron detection requirements"; anyhow this is of little use
when it comes to the validation of an instrument. The general rule expressed in
[43] comes from an analysis of the ANSI-N42.34 and ANSI 42.35. In those standard
documents, the prescription is translated into operational tests to measure if the
detector meets the sensibility criteria. In the same paper from the U.S. Department
of Energy (PNNL-18903), procedures and measurable quantities, that can help to
asses if the general prescription is met, are reported. Measurable neutron sensitivity
and γ insensitivity quantity for neutron detectors are:
• absolute neutron detection efficiency εabs−n;
• Intrinsic γ-neutron detection efficiency εintγ−n;
• Gamma absolute rejection ratio for neutrons, GARRn.
εabs−n is measured in the absence of γ sources. It is the ratio between the neutron
emitted from a source of 252Cf (37ng, ≈ 20µCi) at 2m distance from the detector
when the neutron source is moderated by 5mm of lead and 25mm of polyethene.
The number of detected neutrons in this condition shall be more abundant than
2.5 per second. The εintγ−n is the net number of event tagged as "neutron" with
respect to the total number of γ hitting the detector when the detector is exposed to
a 10mR/h of a γ source (usually 192Ir,137Cs or 60Co) in absence of neutron source.
εintγ−n < 10−6 is the minimum value that ensure to fulfil the general prescription.
GARRn is defined as in Equation (1.2) as the absolute neutron detection efficiency
in presence of both sources (εabs−nγ) divided by the absolute neutron detection
efficiency of the detector (εabs−n). If γ source would have no impact the GARRn
would be 1, however, a GARRn between 0.9 and 1.1 at 10mR/h γ exposure is




The details of the instruments and its minimum requirements have been settled by
IAEA in collaboration with Europool and Interpool and collected in the IAEA-TECDOC
1312 and the IAEA-NSS1:Technical and Functional Specification for Border Radiation
Monitoring Equipment [41, 42].
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Radiation Portal Monitors and Personal or Hand-held radiation detection devices
must fulfil the criteria as mentioned above, and by operational means, they have
to guarantee a limited number of false alarm per operation period not to halt the
border procedure. The procedures that measure whether those criteria are met are
reported in the IEC 62244 and ANSI 34.35 standards, for what it concerns the RPMs,
and into the IEC 62327 and ANSI 34.34 standards for what it concerns the RIIDs.
1.3.3 Radiation Portal Monitors
Radiation Portals Monitors (RPMs) are pass-through monitors, made usually by
two pillars, each of them containing a γ and a neutron detector. For those kinds of
instruments, the neutron and the gamma alarms must be differentiated to identify
better the source and the procedure that should be adopted. RPMs are designed
to be used at checkpoints and are very useful in the scan of the flow of vehicles,
people, luggage and goods without interfering with their flow. RPMs are equipped
with an occupancy sensor, so when the scanned area is not occupied, it measures the
background radiation, and it automatically adjusts the alarm threshold level. RPMs
are installed in the so-called choke points, where the flow can be forced to pass, that
is why RPMs are particularly useful at borders, customs, airports or international
train stations. They are meant to alert the authorities about the presence of nuclear
or radioactive material.
Fig. 1.5: Example of veicles RPMs at border.
γ detectors are large area plastic scintillators, due to intrinsic low cost, or sodium-
iodide (NaI) or caesium-iodide (CsI) inorganic scintillators, while neutron detectors
could be based on 3He, 4He tubes or plastic scintillators. RPM detectors should be
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Fig. 1.6: Example of pedestrian RPMs at airport border.
calibrated periodically to guarantee that they still have the sensitivity required by
IAEA [41].
The control procedure requires that when an alarm is triggered, the suspicious cargo
should pass again trough the portal and, if the alarm is repeated, the vehicle or
pedestrian has to be out-flowed and checked with specific hand-held instrumentation
to localise and possibly identify the source.
ANSI standard 42.34 set the threshold for the response to γ and neutron radiation.
In particular, for the γ sensitivity it is required that at a background level of not more
than 20µR/h an alarm shall be triggered when exposure rate is increased due to
one of the sources reported in the Table 1.2 with their required activity. The source
shall be placed in between the two pillars of the RPM, and it has to be moved at
8km/h in case of vehicle RPM, or 1.2m/s in case of pedestrian one. The probability
of detecting the source should be higher than 90% with 95% confidence. This means
that alarms have to be triggered at least 59 times in 60 passages. The sources listed in
Table 1.2 tests the sensitivity in an energy range that ranges from 60keV to 2.6MeV .
The neutron source, a 252Cf source with a neutron flux of 2 · 104n/s ± 20%, shall
be detected with the same probability, i.e. in 59 passages out of 60. The neutron
source has to be detected even in the presence of a γ background up to 100µR/h.
The RPMs shall not trigger false alarms above one on 1000 passages at a background
level not less than 5µR/h.
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1.3.4 Radiation Detectors and Hand-held Radioisotope
Identification Detectors
Personal radiation detectors (PRDs) are light, small, high sensitivity and battery-
operated devices. They are about the size of a mobile phone to be easily worn at
the belt or carried around in the pocket (Figure 1.7). They allow for a hands-free
scan providing alarms if a suspicious level of radiation is detected. They are mainly
used for personal protection of officers involved in nuclear security scenarios. Those
instruments, based on scintillator detectors2 like the CsI or the NaI, are factory
calibrated, and they guarantee 400h of operation. The false alarm should not occur
more than once per hour since any alarm has to be verified, moving the PRDs close
to the source or person suspected to have triggered the alarm. The PDRs emits
audible, luminous or vibrating signal whose intensity is proportional to the radiation
field, in this sense when the PRD is closer to the source it will emit higher signal,
allowing for a localisation of the source; this kind of scan should be performed no
farther than 15 cm from the surfaces of the pack suspected to contain a source [15,
41, 42].
Fig. 1.7: Example of Personal Radiation Detectors [15].
There also exists Hand-held devices with a radioisotope identification capability
(RIIDs). Even if they do not allow for hands-free operation, Hand-held RIIDs are very
flexible instruments since they can be used as primary detector search for radioactive
sources when there is no forced flux of people, good or vehicles trough a choke
point or to confirm alarms from RPMs. Those instruments are inherently more
complicated, and the operators have to follow the training since the human factor
in non-fixed radiation detectors is of vital importance. When they are used as a
secondary detector to confirm the alarm from an RPM, the instrument should be kept
2Other Geiger-muller or gas proportional counter detectors are commercialised, but they do not meet
the latest European and ANSI standards.
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at few centimetres from the package surface and moved slowly. If the alarm level
is constant all around the package, it is most probably a NORM that triggered the
alarm since an RDD o SNM would appear as a localised source. More information
can be obtained if the detector is capable of identifying the source by analysis of the
energy spectrum.
Fig. 1.8: Example of Hand-held Gamma or Neutron Search Detector and Radiation Identifier
Detectors [15].
The preferred γ detectors are based on NaI or CsI. Since it is not possible in general
to distinguish between the neutron and the γ alarms using plastic scintillators, they
are rarely used in RIIDs, and an additional detector is used for the neutrons, typically
a 3He tube. NaI/CsI detectors are more often used since they allow to identify the
radionuclide better. Hand-held instruments usually measure on a time scale of about
0.5 seconds, that is also the required time to trigger an alarm. Sometimes those
instruments can have a α/β probe to check if any surface contamination occurred.
To be qualified as a RIID a hand-held instruments must:
• measure the γ spectra over a range that covers energy from 30 keV to 3 MeV;
• process the spectrum to determine the energy and the area of the spectrum
lines, as well as the overall spectrum shape;
• embed a decision logic to compare the spectrum lines and shape with lookup
tables;
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• use decision making filters to assign the energy to the correspondent radionu-
clide, especially in case of shielding with a heavy box or within other licit
radioactive material to mask the line of the smuggled source.
With RIIDs not only radionuclide have to be identified, but also the instrument
should clearly state the category at which they belong: Nuclear Material, Medical
Radionuclides, Industrial Radionuclide or NORMS as specified in Section 10 of IAEA
Reference Manual for Illicit Trafficking prevention at Borders[15].
Small neutron detectors are, instead, less sensitive and not suitable to correctly
identify a weak neutron source in a short time. Indeed to obtain reliable information,
mainly when weak neutron field is expected, they can be operated to measure
neutrons flux on a larger time scale.
According to the ANSI 42.35 standard, RIIDs are required to trigger an alarm,
in 1 second, when an immediate increase of 50µR/h from a 137Cs source to the
background occurs. Within 5 seconds, the instrument shall indicate the new dose
rate with a maximum error of 50%. When the radiation field returns to its original
values the decrease shall be indicated in 1 second, and in 5 seconds the instrument
has to indicate the new level of radiation with a maximum error of 50%. The relative
intrinsic error in the response od the instruments to a 137Cs dose shall not exceed
the 30%. In order to test this specification the measurement procedure requires that
when a threshold for an alarm is set at 1 mR/h dose rate, an instrument exposed
to a 2 mR/h radiation field from a 137Cs source, an alarm shall be triggered within
3 seconds. When exposed to an unmoderated 0.01µg 252Cf source at about 25
cm from the detector, the neutron alarms shall be activated within 2 seconds. The
radionuclide identification requires that, when exposed to a 50µR/h dose rate, the
detector identifies the source and the category in 8 runs on ten consecutive trials.
The instruments shall be able to identify, with this confidence level, at least two
sources at the same time. This test is usually performed with a 241Am and a 232Th
sources. These requirements shall be met even in the presence of a γ radiation from
a strong β shielded source (bremsstrahlung, x-rays photons etc...). The false alarm
rate is tested in a 10 µR/h radiation field, and the instrument must not identify any
radionuclide in 8 out of 10 consecutive trials. The only radionuclide accepted is the
NORM 40K, and if it can not be removed or shielded the instruments must identify
only this radionuclide. Those tests are repeated placing a steel plate between the
source and the detector, in order to test whether the instruments are capable of
radionuclide identification even in the presence of surrounding material that may
alter the energy spectrum.
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The neutron alarm, on the other side, shall be tested under 60Co radiation field up
to the maximum dose rate specified by the manufacturer, the neutron alarm shall









Neutron 252Cf 2 · 104n/s ± 20%
Tab. 1.2: Activity of the sources used in standard tests shall be within 20% of the values
reported in the table
1.3.5 Diffuse Monitoring
In the last few years, an increasing attention in the field of nuclear security have
been focused on the security in towns or in at the so-called Major Public Events as
defined by IAEA, like the Beijing Olympics Game, the Youth Days in Panama, big
musical festival or International Politics Meeting (G8, G20 etcetera) [44]. In those
situations, the typical security measures should be further integrated by a novel
concept called diffuse monitoring. The concept behind the diffuse monitoring is to
create a network of detector that can measure the radiation level on a large area. For
this reason, small and portable detectors are appealing for this specific application
since they can be mounted on drones, distributed to bus and taxi drivers, letter
carriers, police officers, security staff, or placed in fixed point (like a traffic light)
around the most sensitive target. Each of the RIIDs used in a diffuse monitoring
application should be connected to a central hub where it can send information,
geo-tagged and time-tagged, about the radiation levels measured. The resulting
grid of detector, whose information are aggregated and centrally analysed, allows
moving the paradigm of nuclear security from fixed checkpoints to continuous and
capillary monitoring.
An example of those detectors is the one commercialised by Kromek Group: the
DS3-Net [45]. Each unit consists of a RIID (Figure 1.9) that connects via Bluetooth
to a smartphone.
A dedicated application sends the measurements results and the GPS data to a
central unit that process the data and eventually send to the app an alarm. The
diffusion of the instruments and the central processing of all the information allow
them to build up a map of the measured level of background in a wide area. A
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Fig. 1.9: D3S Detector commercialised by Kromek Group plc [45].
system like that can be easily embedded in a drone to increase the area that can be
monitored [46].
Figure 1.10 shows the background radiation level changes as a function of position
within the city. This is related to the amount of people, goods and buildings
populating the area. This highlight the need for an alarm threshold level that
is, again, a function of the position. In case of Diffuse Monitoring, the threshold is
computed by the central computational unit while in case of the RPMs, PRDs and
RIIDs it is now clear why the background evaluation is so important to meet the
failure rate required by IAEA.
At the current stage, all the instruments considered by the standard procedures and
protocols are based on two different detectors for γ and neutron radiation to meet
the sensitivity criteria for γ and neutron radiation. However, in the last two decades,
the advancement in detectors technology allows building detectors that are not only
sensitive to both radiations but also capable to discriminate the detected one. This
feature could be of great interest since it would allow increasing the detector volume
within the same dimensions of the market-ready detectors nowadays in use. This
thesis will focus on the study of those materials, and in particular features that,
in the signal acquisition chan, would impact the most on discrimination capability,
since, in a mixed γ and neutron field, good discrimination would make possible to
meet the IAEA sensitivity criteria.
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Fig. 1.10: Image of the reconstructed map of background radioactivity in a city with the
D3S-Net instrument [45].
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2Novel approach to γ-Neutron
discrimination
State of the art portable radiation detector can be based on two different strategies
to be effective and meet the sensitivity criteria and the GARR level required by
the standards mentioned in the previous chapter. On the one hand, the use of
two different detectors for γs and neutrons, on the other hand, a single active
volume sensitive to both radiations at the same time can be used. In the first case
volumes, threshold and signal processing strategies are different and optimised
independently for the two detectors embedded in a single instrument. In the second
case, discrimination techniques should be optimised in order to make the particle
identification good enough to avoid misidentification that would worsen the GARRn.
This chapter will start with a review of the techniques for neutron detection when
two separate detectors are used, while in the second part of the chapter I will review
the solution for a combined γ and neutron detection. The combined detection is
based on those novel scintillators capable of distinguishing particles according to
the different light temporal development they trigger in the scintillators, called
Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) capable scintillators. Several algorithms exist
to distinguish particles according to the signal shape in PSD scintillators. In this
chapter it will be presented digital PSD algorithms that could be easily implemented
in a portable, battery-operated and low computational power instrument. The
discrimination qualifier will also be introduced along with the leading results found
in literature about the measured performances of Pulse Shape Discrimination capable
scintillator coupled with SiPMs.
Introduction to radiation detection
Scintillators as γ detectors are the preferred one because the energies of interest
(between 60 and 1400 keV) are detected with a lower cost with respect to other so-
lutions, and with the benefit of well-established production technology. Scintillators
are an optimal solution since they can measure the dose and allow for a Radiation
Identification by analysing the energy spectrum obtained from a high Z scintillator
(in RIID the most used are NaI and CsI).
On the other hand, neutron detection is not straightforward since the energies
of interests does not allow for uniques detection techniques. Indeed, in Nuclear
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Security scenario, both slow and fast neutrons are expected, and this requires a
priori detection strategy to be defined. In case of separate neutrons and γ detection,
the neutron detection strategy will not interfere with the γ detection one, while in
the combined detection, a choice of a strategy for neutron detection that depends on
energy, has an impact on the γ detection capabilities.
2.1 Neutron Detection
Neutrons are classified as a function of their energy: the so-called slow neutrons have
energy below 0.5 eV, and they are called thermal if they are in thermal equilibrium
with the environment. Neutron in thermal equilibrium at room temperature (25o)
corresponds to neutrons with a Maxwellian energy distribution with mean value
0.025 eV. Neutrons with energy greater than 0.5 eV up to several MeV are called fast.
Sources of concerns in a nuclear security scenario emit fast neutron, but in order
to be transported safely smugglers shield the source; the effect of the shielding is
to reduce neutron energy down to the slow or thermal energy. A key point in this
energy classification is that the interaction between neutron and detector strongly
depends on the neutron energy, and so far it does the kind of detector that can
be used to identify one or another neutron energy class. Slow neutron detection
would allow detecting the sources in the majority of the case as reported in the
ITDB. However, fast neutron detection suffers less from background contamination,
and fast neutrons, however, emerge from the shield. Most of the neutron detectors
produce a response even to γ rays, but with lower efficiency. So far in most of the
neutron detector is possible to ignore the response to the γ since they are however
capable of meeting the gamma insensitivity criteria expressed in the Chapter 1. It is
anyhow essential to understand the working principle of the most used detectors
embedded in small and portable instruments. The neutron interaction with matters
happens mainly via head-on collision with atomic nuclei, and they can result in a
recoiling nucleus, mainly in fast neutron interaction, or in fission fragments, mainly
due to the slow ones [47]. The cross-section and the subsequent detection probability
strongly depends on the neutron energy, as reported in Figure 2.1 for the three most
used converters in neutron detectors.
2.1.1 Slow Neutron Detection
Table 2.1 reports the reaction of the most used converters for slow neutron detection.
Those converters are widely used since their reactions with neutrons have high Q-
values. Thus they create easy to detect heavy charged particles or high energy γ ray.
Slow Neutron detectors are mainly based on proportional counters or scintillators.
The use of silicon detector is not prevalent in this field since they are expensive, and
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Fig. 2.1: Neutron capture cross section for 10B[n,α], 6Li[n,α] and 3He[n,p] reactions, as
reported from [47]
they work at low temperature in a controlled environment; nevertheless, they are
widely used for neutron imaging or spectrometry in scientific research [48, 49].
In principle detectors for thermal neutron detection should show as response a spec-
trum with a single peak of the full energy (Q-value) from the reaction product. Due
to the high Q-Value in most detectors, especially the gas-based, discrimination versus
γ rays can be performed by the sole pulse amplitude. However, boundary effects
and active volume size may introduce features in the spectrum that would require
accurate post-processing in order to obtain the correct neutron measurement.
n + Product Q Value Final State dσdΩ barns Natural Abundance
10B 7Li + α 2.792 MeV Ground 230 20%
10B 7Li∗ + α 2.310 MeV Excited 3610 20%
6Li 3H + α 4.78 MeV Ground 940 7%
3He 3H + p 0.764 MeV Ground 5330 0%
113Cd γ cascade 9 MeV Excited 20000 12%
156Gd γ cascade 8 MeV Excited 61000 15%
157Gd γ cascade 8 MeV Excited 260000 16%
Tab. 2.1: Main Neutron Capture reaction for slow neutrons. The total cross section for
neutron capture by boron is 3840 bars, 6% of the events left the lithium product in
the ground state, while the remaining 94% events leave the lithium in the excited
state. Capture from Lithium and Helium always gives product in the ground state
[47, 2].
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2.1.2 Proportional Counters
3He based detectors are proportional counters that are considered standard detectors
for nuclear detection in many fields. Their intrinsic insensitivity to γ rays fulfils the
prescription of the [43] and makes them suitable for their use in Radiation Portal
Monitors, where the dimensions of detectors are not an issue. The shortage of 3He,
since it is a by-product of nuclear weapons production process, increased its price,
and it is not possible to build a 3He tube suitable for a small hand-held pager-size
portable device as the one presented in Section 1.3.5.
Boron Based Proportional Counters are a BF3 gas tube that can be used in place
of 3He. However, the BF3 gas is toxic, and it suffers from poor discrimination in
case of high γ ray flux [47]. In fact, in those proportional counter, the possibility
that one of the two fission fragments escape the tube is non-negligible because the
gas pressure should not exceed 1 atm [47]. This is the cause of the so-called wall
effect, a distortion of the fission fragment energy spectrum that may introduce a
misidentification of γ as neutrons, altering the GAARn. An exemplary spectrum is
reported in Figure 2.2. Both high gamma flux and small dimensions of the active
volume can reduce the gap between the pulses of the γ and the pulses of the neutron
resulting in an overlap of the γ and neutron regions.
Fig. 2.2: BF3 proportional counter spectrum: line represent the gamma threshold above
which the detected events are tagged as neutrons
To partially overcome the toxicity and the non-ideal properties of the BF3 as pro-
portional counters, it is also possible to coat with 10B the inner side of a standard
proportional counter detector. In this case, to allow the fragments to reach the
active volume, a tiny layer of 10B should be deposited, affecting the neutron capture
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efficiency and the γ discrimination. Other solutions based on the suspension of
nano-particles of B4C, whose diameter is less than the range of the disintegration
fragments are currently under study. Those solutions can be useful for the RPM,
but the technology is still not mature enough since the nano-particles tend to fix to
chamber walls with consequent reduction of detection efficiency over time [2].
2.1.3 Scintillators
Thermal neutrons can be detected with standard scintillator materials doped or
covered with a converter, most likely the Lithium or the Boron. ZnS can be mixed
with LiF with 95% enriched 6Li or with 10B. ZnS can produce up to 160000 photons
per neutron converted by the 6Li capture reaction. It is not very translucent to its
our scintillating light, and effective light collection can be achieved if the scintillator
is thinner than 1 mm [50], reducing neutron efficiency. Moreover, the enrichment of
LiF is a costly procedure. However, companies like Scintacor, Eljen and Saint-Gobain
produce 6Li/ZnS screens for neutron detection [51, 52, 53]. Boron mixed with ZnS
scintillator are also available and manufactured by Bridgeport Instruments [54].
This scintillator is less performing than the 6Li based one since even though the
neutron capture cross-section for the Boron is higher even at the natural isotopic
composition, the Q-value of the reaction is lower.
Another very used option is to load liquid organic scintillators with 6Li, 10B, Gadolin-
ium or Cadmium. The liquid scintillators act as moderator, as a converter and as
charged particle detectors but, in the case of Lithium or Boron loading, they result
in a poor light yield for neutron absorption, equivalent less than a 400 keV electron.
Therefore is necessary the use of Pulse Shape Discrimination methods, algorithms
that allow for the determination of the nature of impinging particle (γ or neutron)
based on the analysis of the full waveform acquired with a fast Data Acquisition
system. Gadolinium and Cadmium, on the other side, produce a cascade of γ rays
whose total energy is 8-9 MeV; so far a detector with a volume large enough to absorb
all the γs in necessary to achieve good discrimination based on pulse amplitude. An
advantage of liquid scintillators is their intrinsic sensitivity to fast neutron, but they
are not widely used in nuclear security application for concerns raised by the toxicity
and flammability of the scintillator itself. Liquid scintillators are, on the other hand,
widely used in neutron and neutrino research where large volume and affordable
detectors are the preferred solution [2].
Solid plastic scintillators loaded with 6Li or 10B are not commercially available even
if they are not toxic nor flammable and can be manufactured in different shape and
sizes. They generally have a lower light yield requiring a pulse shape analysis to
discriminate γ from neutrons [55, 56].
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Arktis commercialise a gas scintillator tube lined with 6Li, based on 4He as scin-
tillating gas [57]. This solution, however, suffers from the same drawbacks of
the Boron-based proportional counters in terms of Lithium coating thickness and
consequent thermal neutron detection efficiency [2].
Scintacor and Saint-Gobain commercialise the used for decades 6Li based glass
scintillators. Those detectors are a well-established technology in neutron detection.
However, they are not suitable for nuclear security for two reasons. On the one
hand, neutron capture events have the same amplitude of a 1.5 MeV γ ray due to
quenching mechanism inside the glass. On the other hand, the pulse shape of a γ
or a neutron-induced pulse are almost identical, so nor amplitude nor pulse shape
analysis can be used to efficiently for particle discrimination [50].
2.1.4 Fast Neutron Detectors
Nuclear reaction with 3He, 6Li or 10B can be used as well to detect fast neutron, but
they have a low cross-section, and those reactions may not guarantee the neutron
sensitivity for fast neutron in small detectors required by the standards. Indeed since
the cross-section for high energy neutrons is fewer than 10 barns (Figure 2.3), a
detector 100 times larger would be required in order to meet the same efficiency
[47] of slow neutron detection even for fast neutron. However, the direct detection
of fast neutrons is possible, and it opens up the possibility to determine the direction
of the incoming neutron. This information can be used both to determine the
localisation of the source better and to reduce the background. The energy alone
can not reduce the background since the cosmic neutrons are in the fast neutron
energy range. In addition to that, the possibility to retain the energy information
is of great importance in the determination of the source type and eventually the
shielding, not to mention that the lack of moderator allow to build the very compact
detector, pretty useful for the diffuse monitoring application [2]
Fast neutron detectors rely on the scattering of neutrons with the Hydrogen. The
cross section of the fast neutron detection depends only on the scattering cross
section σs, so that the detection efficiency (ε) goes as an exponential function for
the single interacting material:
ε = 1 − e−Nσsd (2.1)
Where the N is the density of target nuclei, and d is the pathway through the
material. In most cases, like plastic scintillators used for fast neutron detection, the
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Fig. 2.3: Cross section for nuclear reaction 3He(n, p)3H and 6Li(n, α)3H induced by fast
neutron as reported in [47].
most probable scattering is against hydrogen and carbon nuclei. Equation (2.1)







Even if it does not exist an analytical expression for the scattering cross-section, an






Non-relativistic neutrons have energy below 939 MeV, that is the case in a nuclear
security application, and the energy transferred to the recoiling nucleus can be
estimated by imposing the momentum and energy conservation. The energy of
the recoil nucleus ER with mass A depends on its recoil angle θ and the incoming
energy neutron En as in Equation (2.4). The interaction mechanism is sketched in
Figure 2.4 for a laboratory coordinate reference system[47].
ER =
2A
(1 + A)2 cos
2θEn (2.4)
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The only case in which the neutron energy can be transferred entirely to the nucleus
is in the case A = 1 and θ = 0, namely for the neutron backscatter by a hydrogen
atom. Angles other than 0o give rise to a continuum in the distribution down to 0. In
all the other cases, only a fraction of the neutron energy is transferred. It is possible,
thanks to unfolding techniques, to recover the energy spectra of the neutrons to
identify the source and possible shielding [59].
Fig. 2.4: Neutron scattering in laboratory reference system
These scintillators are intrinsically sensitive to γ rays, so far it is mandatory to have
techniques to distinguish the two particles. Time of Flight measurements to separate
γ from neutrons is the preferred and the most robust techniques, but it can not be
used in a portable detector [47].
2.2 Pulse Shape Discrimination scintillators
A PSD scintillator sensitive to all neutron energy of interest does not exist. Moreover,
the choice of the energy of interest for neutron detection in PSD scintillators defines
even the γ interaction, so far the radio-nuclide identification capability. The two most
used varieties of PSD scintillators are the inorganic and the plastic scintillators with
enhanced pulse shape discrimination capabilities. Inorganic elpasolite scintillators
are high Z materials doped with 6Li. The 6Li dopant makes those scintillators
sensitive to thermal neutrons via nuclear capture reactions, and the high Z allows
for the photo-peak absorption of γ rays in the energy of interest (60 keV - 1.4 MeV)
allowing for a radionuclide identification via peak spectrum analysis. On the other
hand, organic scintillators detectors allow for fast neutron scattering on hydrogen
or carbon nuclei. They have a low Z, so far the most probable γ interaction for
the energy of interest is the Compton scattering, not allowing for the radionuclide
identification but only for the dose evaluation. Other solutions, like composite
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 2.5: Elastic Scattering cross section σs(En) for Hydrogen, Deuterium, Helium (in the
isotopes 4He and 4He) and for carbon as reported in [47].
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scintillators obtained by coupling plastic and ZnS/6Li scintillator, can be engineered,
but they are not widely used so they will not be treated in this dissertation [60].
2.2.1 Elpasolite scintillators
A key element in elpasolite scintillators is the presence of Lithium, that enriched in
6Li at 95% guarantees a good thermal neutron detection efficiency without altering
the scintillation properties of those material thanks to the well-established growth
methodology [61]. Cerium used as a dopant in elpasolite has a strong influence in
the light temporal distribution since it affects the lifetime of excited states at the base
of light generation [62]. Temperature influences as well not only the light output but
also the pulse shape differences [63, 64]. Another drawback is that those scintillators
are highly hygroscopic, so dedicated housing is required in on-field use. Detection of
the alpha particle generated by the neutron-induced reaction 6Li(n,α)3H, produces
the same amount of light of a γ ray between 3 and 3.5 MeV and it is possible to
achieve neutron-gamma discrimination based on sole pulse amplitude [65]. To
further improve the purity of neutrons detected events, additional discrimination
can be achieved with pulse-shape discrimination techniques [66].
One of the most used elpasolite is the CLYC, whose chemical formula reads Cs2LiY Cl6(Ce).
It has a capture efficiency slightly above 10% and an energy resolution of 662 γ
ray from 137Cs of 5% as measured in [67]. The different pulse shape depends on
the difference in excited levels of the crystal energy levels according to the ionising
density. Light is emitted with 3 decay time constant τ1, τ2 and τ3. For the CLYC
in particular low ionising density associated to the electron detection from γ ray
absorption excites the valence electron giving rise to the so-called Core Valence Light
(τ1) that presents typical decay time in the order of 1ns. This light is associated with
the transition from the 5p level of the Cs+ core band to the 3p level of Cl− valence
band. Scintillating photons may be absorbed by the dopant and re-emitted with a
typical time constant of 30ns. Due to the so-called deep-trapping mechanism, the
charge carrier could be trapped in an excited state of Ce+ and released with a time
constant τ2 of 1µs as reported in [68].
The third component of the scintillating light arises from an exciton-Ce+ interaction
and its typical light time decay time τ3 lies between 1 and 6 µs according to the
percentage of the dopant. Core Valence Light is present only under γ excitation,
while the processes that give rise to the τ2,3 components of scintillation light are
always present. CLYC can be used not only for thermal neutron detection. Indeed,
if it is enriched in 7Li, it showed neutron spectroscopy capability [70]. However,
the poor resolution for fast neutron spectroscopy and the reduced thermal neutron
efficiency limits the diffusion of this solution.
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Fig. 2.6: Images of the CLLC scintillators from [69]
CLLC is similar to the CLYC, but with Lanthanum instead of Yttrium, since it is a
little brighter it presents a 662 γ ray resolution of 3.5%, but it suffers from internal
activity due to the presence of Lanthanum. CLLB and CLLB-C, with chemical formula
Cs2LiLaBr6(Ce) presents a higher light yield that results in an energy resolution of
the 662 keV peak below 3%, but it presents internal activity due to the Lanthanum a
slightly worst pulse shape discrimination capability [62].
2.2.2 Plastic PSD scintillators
Pulse shape difference in plastic scintillators is obtained by means of optimisation
of scintillating primary and secondary dye ratio in the plastic matrix. Emitted
photons can be up to a factor 2 in some components, making relatively easy the
particle tagging. The effect of different % of dye was studied mainly since in some
concentration the ageing effect is not negligible, making the scintillators no longer
suitable for nuclear security purposes [47]. Nowadays, the Polyphenol oxidase (PPO)
dye concentration can be higher than 20% and up to 36%. The secondary dye can
be a POPOP benzene scintillator used as a light wavelength shifter. 7-diethylamino-
4-methyl coumarin secondary dye used in place of POPOP can enhance both the
light output and the PSD capability as reported in [71].
The addition of divinylbenzene (DVB) was tested to contain the ageing at different
concentration of secondary dye (PPO) as reported in [71]. Moreover, post-treatment
techniques of scintillators with ethanol (EtOH) allowed recovering the surface
detriment when PPO concentration exceeds 30%.
To further reduce ageing, the use of non-aromatic molecules (like PMMA) as a
medium to solve aromatic Lithium salt has experimented, but it resulted in a reduced
light output that makes difficult the discrimination of γ and neutron [72]. Higher
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Fig. 2.7: Images of Plastic Scintillators with PSD capability scintillators with relative Light
Output (LO) from [71]
it is the solubility of the Lithium salt, more probable is the light quenching from
the PPO; on the other side, increasing the number of rings to reduce the solubility
produces a red-shift in the generated light that reduces, even more, the total light
output.
2.2.3 Pulse Shape Discrimination scintillators for Nuclear
Security
The main characteristics of the scintillators in use in nuclear security with pulse
shape discrimination capable scintillators are reported in Table 2.2. A comparison of
γ spectroscopy capability with standard scintillators for γ spectroscopy is reported in
Figure 2.9. In particular, the materials reported in this subsection are the ones used
in the literature summarised in the Section 2.5.
In this dissertation, the crystal used in order to compare and to evaluate the two de-
tection strategies are the CLLB and the EJ-276 since their emission light wavelength
matches the maximum efficiency of the Silicon Multipliers used.
2.3 Pulse Discrimination Algorithms
Several algorithms have been proposed to distinguish particles according to the
signal shape from PSD scintillators. The discrimination algorithm used, may be
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Fig. 2.8: Images of one year old PSD plastic scintillator developed at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory with different concentration of PPO, DVB tested to reduce the
ageing effect [71]
either the computation of a single observable that, according to a threshold value,
determines if a signal is most likely be produced by a neutron or a γ or more compli-
cated discrimination scheme based on the analysis of the pulse shape by a neutral
network in machine learning or artificial intelligence application. The discrimination
techniques of interest for this thesis are the one requiring low computational power,
so far the Neural Network is not detailed. Exemplary results of a machine learning
discrimination algorithm will be presented at the end of the chapter. The temporal
distribution of photons mostly differs in the long decay component, and an observ-
able that could enhance and measure this difference is the core of the majority of
pulse shape discrimination algorithms. In analogue electronics, the algorithms for
particle identification were the Zero-Crossing and the Charge Comparison. These
g/cm2 ph/MeV λpeak [nm] ∆EE 662keV τγ [ns] τn [ns]
CLLB 4.2 40000 420 ≤ 4% 180(61%) 180(50%)
1080(39%) 1080(50%)












Tab. 2.2: Main characteristic of the most used plastic and inorganic scintillators suitable for
Nuclear Security Applications as reported from produced data-sheets [73, 74, 75,
76]
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Fig. 2.9: Different γ detection performances of PSD scintillators compared to standard γ
scintillator detectors [2]
two discrimination schemes were implemented in an analogue circuit configura-
tion. The first one consists in a filter that transforms the detected signal into a
bipolar pulse: the time between the trigger and the zero-crossing is retained as
discrimination parameter [77] since it was longer for the particle with the long decay
component. The Analogue Charge Comparison (CCA) is an algorithm that retains as
discrimination parameter the ratio between the integral of the signal and the charge
integrated into the tail via a combination of different RC circuits, as described in
[78]. With the advent of the digital era, those algorithms were implemented in
digital circuits. The zero-crossing that was the most promising one in the analogue
implementation failed to be as effective in the digital implementation due to the
finite resolution with which was possible to implement the digital filter. Charge
Comparison, on the other hand, proved to be more fruitful, but also other algorithm
born due to the potentiality opened up by the digital signal treatment. The general
approach was to compare:
• the charge in the tail
• a point in the signal falling edge
with respect to:
• the total charge in the signal
• the signal amplitude
The algorithms presented in the following section is then the possible combination
of these quantities as they are easy to be computed with digital circuits, so far usable
in a real case scenario.
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2.3.1 Digital PSD algorithms
The digital version of the CCA showed better performances concerning the digital
implementation of the zero-crossing time method since the digital filter that shapes
the signal is not as effective as the analogue one in discriminating particles [79].
2.3.2 Algorithm for on-line discrimination
Among the one found in literature, four algorithms for pulse shape discrimination
were compared, since they are the one most suitable to purse on-line discrimination
in a small device with low computational power.
• Constant Time: The Constant Time (CT) algorithm discriminates based on the
value of the signal S(t), at time t concerning the onset, normalised to the total
signal area [80]
PSD = S(t̄CT )∫
S(t)dt (2.5)
Where t̄CT is the time-lapse since the onset of the signal.
• Pulse Gradient Analysis: The Pulse Gradient Analysis (PGA) algorithm discrim-
inates the pulses on the basis of the value of the signal S(t), at time t with
respect to the onset, normalised to the peak [81].
PSD = S(t̄P GA)
max{S(t)} (2.6)
where, as above, the t̄P GA is the time lapse since the onset of the signal.
• Charge comparison: The Charge Comparison algorithm (PSDCC) discriminates
the pulses on the basis of the ratio between the integral of the signal tail and






where tdelay is the time lapse since the onset of the signal from where the
integration window, that last tint, starts.
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• Peak - Tail: The Peak-Tail algorithm (PSDP T ) is a new proposed algorithm in
which discrimination is obtained by normalising the signal to the peak value






where tdelay and tint are defined as for the CC algorithm.
2.4 γ-neutron discrimination qualifiers
In order to tag the detected particle, a threshold is set on PSD parameter value in
order to determine which was the impinging particle nature. The standard qualifier
to quantify the discrimination power is the Figure of Merit (F.o.M.) defined as
the distance between the centroids of the γ and neutron related PSD distributions,
divided the sum of their Full-Width Half Maximum (FWHM), as in Equation (2.9)
F.o.M. = ∆P SD
FWHMγs + FWHMneutrons
(2.9)
Fig. 2.10: Arbitrary Gaussian distributions showing the meaning of F.o.M.’s main parame-
ters by graphic means.
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If the two PSD are Gaussian distributed, the meaning of the F.o.M.can be linked
to the σ of the distribution, as from Equations (2.11), since the ∆P SD and the two
FWHMs can be written as a function of σ.
F.o.M. = ∆P SD
FWHMγs + FWHMneutrons
(2.10)
= κ · (σγ + σneutrons)2.355 · (σγ + σneutrons)
(2.11)
κ = 2.355 · F.o.M. (2.12)
where κ is the distance of PSD distribution in units of σ. F.o.M.values greater than
2.2 mean that two distributions are distant more than 5σs, being σ the root square
of the distribution’s variance. The 3σ limit corresponds to a F.o.M.of 1.27. The
F.o.M.is evaluated for a reference energy window of particular interest for the spe-
cific application to compare the performances of different detectors or algorithms.
In detectors used for fast neutron detection, it was observed that F.o.M.is a function
of energy. When the detectors are calibrated using a γ source, the energy is expressed
in eVee, electron-volt electron equivalent. A keVee correspond to the amount of light
generated from one keV energy released by γ ray. Indeed, for fast neutron detector,
the minimum energy Emin[eV ee] that guarantees a F.o.M.(E)> 1.27 can be used as
another qualifier of the goodness of discrimination.
Emin : F.o.M(Emin) ≥ 1.27. (2.13)
2.5 State of Art in PSD
The comparison of different pulse shape discrimination systems was the main topic
of several publications. In particular, the comparison of different scintillators, light
detection systems or algorithms showed that the use of SiPM is a viable solution,
but with some caveat. So far, is interesting to compare not only the Stilbene with
other materials like the Eljen EJ-299-34 (that was the same scintillator as the EJ
276-34 but with more reduced mechanical properties) in order to qualify those new
materials concerning a reference standard, but also to test how and if the use of
SiPM affects the discrimination capabilities. In addition to that, elpasolite crystals
were tested with different temperature conditions, as scintillation light profile (light
yield and temporal profile) depends on temperature.
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The first relevant study is the one conducted by Ruck Flaska and Pozzi [83] that
investigated discrimination capability of a stilbene scintillator coupled with SiPMs.
In that work results from a stilbene crystal 6x6x10mm3 coupled to a PMT, and
two different SiPMs from SensL (Figure 2.11), a B and a C series, were compared
[84]. The main difference between those two SiPMs is the PDE and the total
sensor capacitance, affecting the electronic signal shape. The output signal has
been digitised with a CAEN DT5730 digitiser, 500 Msps, 14 bits and 2V of input
dynamic range. Discrimination was based on the (2.7), so far, the area was chosen
as normalisation.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2.11: Experimental set-up for the Stilbene readout by a PMT (Fig. a) and for a SiPM
(Fig. b) as reported in [83]
A 252Cf source has been used as γ and neutron source; in Figure 2.12 the traces from
a typical neutron and γ pulse are reported;
In this paper, it is shown that the performances of SiPMs are comparable to the ones
of the PMT. In the energy range between 100 and 200 keVee, the FOM is reported in
Table 2.3. In Figure 2.13 the PSD value as a function of pulse energy for the C-Series
SiPM and the histogram of the PSDCCA for the three configurations in the energy
window between 100 and 200 keVee is reported.




Tab. 2.3: F.o.M.as reported in [SilbeneSiPM]
A second relevant study compared how different algorithms affect the EJ-299/34
capabilities [85]. The signal from the scintillators that is the first production of the
actual EJ-276 but with more inferior mechanical properties whose dimensions are
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Fig. 2.12: Digitised 1 MeVee neutron and γ ray pulse measured with the stilbene crystal
coupled to a B-Series SiPM [83]
10x10x50mm3, was digitised and tested with two different algorithms: the digital
charge comparison method (2.7) and a genetic algorithm. The F.o.M.(E)is reported
in Figure 2.14 for two different algorithms and three light detectors: an XP2262 PMT,
an FB60035 SiPM from FBK and an s10985-50c SiPM from Hamamatsu Photonic
(HPK).
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Fig. 2.13: In Figure (a) PSD distribution vs the energy and in Figure (b) the histogram of
PSDCCM in the energy windows 100-,200 keVee [83]
Fig. 2.14: F.o.M.(E)measured with the EJ-299/34 detector. Only every second point has
±2σ error bar.
While the genetic algorithm, (GA) and the digital Charge Comparison (DCC, as
it is referred to in [85]) method give similar results with a bias towards the GA,
even in this study, it is confirmed that the light sensor strongly influences PSD.
F.o.M.between 2.5 and 3 for signals higher than 1500 keVee is obtained for the
measurement performed with the PMT, while with the SiPM F.o.M.does not exceed
2.
An exemplary study carried out with a CLYC crystal compared the discrimination
obtained with two different SiPM arrays. The array is made out by 16 channels, each
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of them with an active area of 6x6mm2 in the case of C-Series, and a 64 channel
of 3x3mm2 array manufactured by Hamamatsu (C11206-0808FA(X)) [86], both of
them arranged in a square. F.o.M.of 1.5 is achieved when the scintillating light is
read out by the HPK SiPM array. In Figure 2.15, it is clear that with the SensL array
the discrimination is worst as it can be seen in the figure where the slow neutron
and the γ PSD-distribution are overlapped. In this case, the PSD was measured in an
energy interval centred around 3MeV, that is the γ equivalent energy deposited by
the α particle generated by the detection of a neutron.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2.15: PSD vs the energy distribution obtained reading the CLYC crystal with an Hama-
matsu array C11206-0808FA (a) or a SensL C-Series array (b)
Temperature dependence of the response of such scintillators has also been studied
in [87]. The F.o.M.decreases, for all the tested algorithm, as temperature increases.
F.o.M.higher than 2, in the reference energy interval, is expected at room tempera-
ture, falling below 1 at 50oC, as reported in Figure 2.16. At high temperature, the
light output of those scintillators is degraded, and the decay time constants change
their proportions making the discrimination more difficult.
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Fig. 2.16: Temperature dependence of F.o.M.for a CLYC crystal as reported in [87]
2.5.1 Comments on PSD results
From the results reported above, there are two main factors that seems to have an
influence in discrimination capability [83, 85]:
• the light sensor and electronics signal shaping
• the discrimination algorithm.
In addition to that, the above mentioned studies suggested that the amount of light
itself may have e crucial role in the discrimination. Even if the all the resulted
obtained so far showed promising good discrimination, there are no systematic
study of all those effects on the PSD performances at one. This is a reason why this
thesis proposes a study that will tackle all the effects that may influence the PSD
capabilities.
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3Silicon Photomultipliers
The scintillating light from novel PSD scintillators in this work was read out by
Silicon Photomultipliers. In the last two decades Silicon Photomultipliers (SiPM)
became the cutting-edge light sensors with unprecedented single-photon detection
sensitivity, remarkable photon detection efficiency, unprecedented photon number
resolving capability, excellent time resolution and extended dynamic range. Their
features, like the compactness, robustness, insensitivity to magnetic fields and low
operating voltages make them suitable for a class of applications that ranges from
fundamental and applied science to automotive, consumer devices for distance
measurements, and industry. Those advantages, in addition to the design flexibility
and low-cost mass production, allowed SiPM to became the first choice for many
different fields of applications, including the nuclear security one. However, SiPM
has a high intrinsic capacitance, that could actively shape the output signal usually
when arrays of SiPM are built up.
3.1 Working Principle of SiPM
The exploitation of the solid-state silicon technology opened up the possibility
to build a class of Avalanche Photo-diodes sensitive to a single photon, called
Geiger-mode Avalanche Photo-diodes (GM-APDs) or Single Photon Avalanche Diodes
(SPADs). The SPAD is a reverse-biased p-n junction that operates in Geiger-Muller
regime. So far, the response of the SPAD to a light stimulus can not be proportional to
the incoming light field. For application in which single-photon detection is required,
SPADs are excellent detectors, but they are useless in applications where a response
proportional to the incoming light field is critical.
To overcome the single SPAD limits, matrices of SPADs with density up to 104 diodes
per mm2, on a common substrate, with output combined in parallel to a single
output, were manufactured. Thanks to this configuration, the output is proportional
to the number of fired SPADs, being thus proportional to the incoming light field.
Those matrices are called Silicon Photomultipliers [88]. Each cell in a SiPM is a diode
operated at a voltage exceeding breakdown(25-100V depending on the producer) by
few volts. The primary avalanche in each cell can be generated either by a photon
of by a charge carrier freed by thermal excitation or tunnelling effect in silicon. In
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Figure 3.1 an artist’s view of SiPM as a collection of cells is reported along with the
one of a photon that generates a charge carrier that initiates an avalanche.
Fig. 3.1: Artist’s view of the SiPM as collection of SPAD on a single substrate.
Each SPAD in a SiPM is an abrupt n/p junction whose structure is sketched in
Figure 3.2, from reference [89]. The Figure refers to an n+/p configuration, with
a low dopant concentration layer (π) and an enrichment box (p) that realise in
silicon the electric field sketched in Figure 3.2 when the voltage is applied ad diode
terminals.
Fig. 3.2: n+/p junction scheme of single SPAD, as reported in [89]
When a photon is absorbed an electron/hole pair is generated: if the photon is
absorbed above the high electric field region, the holes are drifted towards the high
electric field region, while if absorbed below the electrons are drifted toward the
high electric field. The absorption depth depends on the wavelength of the incident
photon, while the trigger probability depends on the mobility of electrons or holes,
that may trigger with different probability a self-sustained multiplication process.
The electron avalanche needs to be quenched through a resistor placed within the
single cell to prevent the destruction of the cell itself. The current generated by the
avalanche flows through the resistor and causes a voltage drop; when the electric
field is too low to sustain the multiplication process, the avalanche stops, and the
operating voltage is restored in a time proportional to the resistance and capacitance
of the single-cell [89, 90, 91, 92].
The integration of more than one SPAD in a single substrate requires some isolation
between the cells from the electrical and optical point of view. As shown in Figure 3.3
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a guard ring surrounds the high field region, to help a smooth and fast transition to
low values of the electric field; along with the isolation structure that separates each
cell from an electrical point of view to reduce cross-talk effect from photons generated
by the multiplication process, as explained in section 3.4.2, optical trenches can also
be implanted.
Fig. 3.3: Cross-section and top view of a single cell in SiPM as reported in [89]
SiPMs have photosensitive areas that range from 1 × 1 mm2 to 6 × 6 mm2. The
single cells are binary detectors (fired/not fired), but the output obtained as the
sum of all the fired cell signals gives information proportional to the light field at
the SiPM surface. In Figure 3.4(a) a typical trace plot of a SiPM response to a light
pulse emitted by a LED is shown. Each trace corresponds to a different number of
fired cells and, since the noise band is small concerning single cell high gain, SiPMs
allows for photon number resolved detection. By integrating the traces, it is possible
to obtain a frequency histogram of the collected charge (Figure 3.4.b) where each
peak corresponds to a different number of fired cell, and the peak distance (∆pp) is
proportional to the charge developed in a single avalanche.
The spread of the first 0-photon peak measures to the system noise, while σ1, that
is slightly larger than the pure electronic noise, reflects non-uniformities of cells.
Despite the high-quality silicon process that allows obtaining unprecedented cells
uniformity, the photon number resolving capability in SiPM is spoiled by that so-
called cell-to-cell gain variation (σcell−to−cell) that can be up to 10%. Peak width
increases with the number of fired cell Nfired following a
√
Nfired law, limiting the
maximum number M of peaks that is possible to resolve. The Sparrow criterion
was suggested to identify the limits in resolving power: it states that two peaks are
no longer resolved if the half-way dip is no longer visible. The quantitative limit is
based on the Resolution parameter R, defined in Equation (3.1), as the ratio between
the peak separation ∆pp and the σcell−to−cell =
√
σ1 − σ0. According to the Sparrow
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Fig. 3.4: Typical trace plot from an SiPM response to pulsed LED light, and frequency
histogram of collected charge proportional to the number of fired cells, as reported
in [93]








3.1.1 Electrical Model of SiPM
Electrical model of SiPM can be found in [96, 97, 89, 98]. Despite small differences
among them, the essence of the model for the single cell is the one reported in
Figure 3.5(a) according to [96]. In this scheme photo-diode is modelled as a
capacitor CD, charged by an excess voltage Vov defined as the difference between
the biasing voltage Vbias and the breakdown voltage Vbd. The steady-ready condition
is represented by an open switch and the capacitor fully charged. The switch closure
models the primary free charge carrier that trigger an avalanche: in this occurrence,
CD discharges until the voltage at capacitor terminals equals to Vbd making Vov = 0.
During the discharge current flows through the junction’s intrinsic resistance RD
and reaches the quenching resistor RQ (usually RQ ≈ 102Ω); current asymptotic
value is ∆V /(RD +RQ). The whole process follows an exponential curve with a time
constant of τD = CDRD. At the end of avalanche quenching the switch goes back to
the "OPEN" position, the Vov is restored, and the cell capacitance is recharged with
a typical time constant of τrecovery = RQCD. The current signal generated by the
process is sketched in 3.5(b).
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.5: (a) Electronic model of a single cell as reported in [96] and (b) the single-cell
Current development in time
The single cell model does not, however, consider the effect of the passive cells
(the not fired ones). It is possible to extend the model considering Nfired fired
cell (box "Active" in 3.6), Ntot − Nfired passive cells (box "Passive" in 3.6) and the
parasitic capacitance, resistance and inductance due to the electrical connections
(box "Parasitic" in 3.6). This extended model is useful in simulations that are meant
to engineer front end electronics since it allows us to consider all the SiPMs electrical
features. Time characteristic of the signal in this model is not altered concerning
the one of the single-cell since the parallel connection between the cell allows the
increased capacitance (Cfiredcell = Nfired ·CD) to be counterbalanced by the parallel
of the resistors RD.
Fig. 3.6: Electronic model of the whole SiPM where Nf cell have been fired and Ntot − Nf
cell that act as passive components
3.1.2 Breakdown Voltage
The breakdown voltage Vbd defines the minimum bias at which the SPAD has to be
operated to work in Geiger-Muller regime. It depends on construction technology
and the temperature. Above the breakdown voltage, the generated free charge
carrier produces a secondary charge with a different probability according to its
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electron or hole nature [89]. Impact ionisation rate for electrons or holes, αe and αh
respectively, are the rate of the secondary pair generated per unit distance travelled
by a primary free charge carrier and they are a function of the electric field in the
so-called "local approximation" [99]. Electron-hole pair generation rate (GR) can be
expressed as in (3.3) as the sum of the product of the impact rate and the current
density for electrons and holes.
GR = αe|Je| + αh|Jh| (3.3)
Conditions for which GR diverges guarantee self-sustained avalanches, so far the
Geiger-Muller avalanche process. Impact ionisation rate for holes and electrons can










Values of W for which integral in Equation (3.4) equals to one is the width of the
high field region, given the impact ionisation rates [100].
Breakdown voltage is strongly depended on the temperature. Indeed, Vbd increase
with temperature because higher temperature enhances the probability of collision
between the free charge carrier and the crystal lattice, reducing the mean free path
[96] and therefore the energy when the free charge carrier hits the lattice. A higher
electric field can compensate energy loss due to a shorter mean free path, so far a
higher Vbd will be required to satisfy the Equation 3.4. In fact large Vbd are expected
with less thick depletion region. It is crucial to notice how it has been measured
that SiPMs with the deeper depleted region have a stronger dependence of the Vbd
on temperature. On the other hand, the cell to cell gain variation is lower with
the deeper depleted region. Usually, lower cell to cell gain variation is preferred
against the temperature variation stability, since it is possible to compensate for the
T variation by acting on the bias voltage. At the same time, it is not possible to
counterbalance the natural cell-to-cell variations [89].
3.2 Gain
The capacitance of the junction defines SiPM gain, and it depends on the over-voltage
Vov as in Equation (3.5)
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G = (CD + Cq) · Vov
q
(3.5)
Where q = 1.6 · 10−19C is the electron charge, and Cq is the parasitic capacitance
of the quenching resistor. The single-cell capacitance varies with its area, being
higher for SiPM with larger pitch. A typical value of gain ranges from 105 to 107,
producing a signal well above the noise band, allowing for the photon counting
capability shown in Figure 3.4. Typical dependence of the gain on Vov can be seen in
Figure 3.7, where the reported gain for a 40µm and 25µm cell pitch comes from a
TCAD simulation [96].
Fig. 3.7: SiPM Gain vs Vov as reported in [96]
3.3 Photon Detection Efficiency
The probability of detecting a photon, Photon Detection Efficiency (PDE) defined as
the product of the Quantum Efficiency (QE), the Trigger Probability (PT ) and the
Geometrical Fill Factor (FF ) as defined in Equation (3.6); those factors depend on
the over-voltage and thus on temperature or physical proprieties as such as the λ of
incoming photons of the electronics placement of the quenching resistor on the cell
that may fade a portion of the active cell area.
PDE(Vov(T ), λ) = QE(λ) · PT (Vov(T ), λ) · FF (3.6)
The SiPM quantum efficiency depends on the wavelength of the impinging photon
and the absorption region thickness (Figure 3.10). QE is a function of two factors:
the probability that a photon crosses the anti-reflective coating (ARC) layer on top of
the sensor and the one that a photon generates an electron-hole pair. The probability
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Fig. 3.8: Effective fired cells as a function of the number of photons per pulse on the active
SiPM surface (full and zoom) for Hamamatsu S10362-050C type, 250 ns gate
length.
Fig. 3.9: The electric field outside the Geiger-Muller regime slowly decrease up to be almost
zero in the substrate.
of generating an eh pair is a sole function of the incoming wavelength. Then the
probability of triggering an avalanche is a function of the temperature and the
wavelength, is related to the absorption depth of photons in silicon, that grows with
the wavelength from ≥10 nm range for the UV/blue light, up to tens of microns
for the near-infrared light. In particular, it is being absorbed above or below the
junction influences the probability to reach the active region before the free charge
carrier recombines.
Figure 3.9 shows the hole/electron drifting in a n on p junction. The charges
above the junction have a higher probability of reaching the high field region, so
far a photon with a wavelength such that this region is the most probable for the
absorption will most likely trigger an avalanche. That is why it is fundamental to
tune the active region thickness according to the specific wavelength is required to
be detected.
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Fig. 3.10: Estimated internal QE vs the wavelength of incident photon for different effective
epitaxial layer thickness.
In particular, considering an n+/p junction, short wavelengths photons features a
small absorption depth. The eh pairs are mainly photo-generated above the junction,
and only holes are drifted towards the avalanche region. In this case, a proper design
of that layer allows better carriers diffusion and minimise the recombination. Indeed,
the visible light is absorbed above and below the high field region, and both carriers
can trigger the avalanche but with a not flat probability due to the different mobility
of the free charge carrier. Finally, NIR photons generate mostly electrons below the
junction.
The FF represents the fraction of the active area that is not shaded by the quenching
resistor, and it increases with the pitch. In Figure 3.11(a) SiPM single cells with
different pitch are shown. From the picture, it is possible to see that smaller is
the cell pitch the smaller is the FF as the passive components cover a higher area
fraction (Figure 3.11(a)).
(a) Details of SiPM cell structure
as reported in [93]
(b) Different SiPM cells with different pitch
The PDE tends to it asymptotic value increasing the Vov, suggesting that higher the
Vov better it would be, as reported in Figure 3.11 for different SiPM manufacturer.
However, with Vov the noise increase and this could spoil the measurements. A
balance between the cell pitch (so the number of available cells) and the Vov is
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Fig. 3.11: Measure of the PDE as function of voltage as reported in [96]
usually found for every specific application. In γ spectroscopy, the use of SiPM with
a smaller pitch, even if the PDE would be lower, is envisaged. Saturation limit is
then moved to a higher number of photons impinging on the sensor, preventing the
high number of photons produced by the scintillator to spoil the measurement.
3.3.1 Non linearities in SiPMs
The limited number of cell in SiPM limits the dynamic range of the SiPM, and it
introduces intrinsic non-linearity. It happens because of the single-cell works in
Geiger-Muller regime. It is reflected in a response that is linear with the number of
incident photos only if the probability for two photons to enter the same cell is low.
Considering the number of photoelectron as the total number of photons incident
on the sensor multiplied by the PDE (Nph.e. = Np · PDE), it is possible to estimate
the number of fired cell Nfired considering the well known problem of putting n
balls in m boxes as the one to put Nphotons in Ntot available cells. The expected
number of boxes expected to contain one or more ball is N = m[1 − (1 − m−1)n].
Equation (3.7) express the statistical problem with the notation used for the fired
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Fig. 3.12: Fit of Equation (3.8) to data acquired with a 1 by 1 mm2 SiPM as reported in
[98]
In the statistical problems of balls placing, when the number of boxes is higher
than ∼ 100 it is possible to consider the normal approximation. In the same way,
the number of actual fired cell when Nph.ee → ∞, and Nph.e./Ntot is finite can be
evaluated by means of Equation (3.8), the limits for Nph.ee → ∞ of Equation (3.7)
that provides a statistical correction to the measured number of photoelectrons
[98].







It should be noticed that this is an approximation since it applies in the ideal
circumstances of no pulse recovery effect, and no noise is considered. When the
occupancy, namely the ratio of the fired cell, is below 10% it was shown that no
deviation from linearity could be appreciated [98].
3.4 SiPM noise evaluation
The noise figures in SiPM can be divided into Primary and Correlated noise [90,
91, 96]. Primary noise identifies all the avalanche initiated by a carrier that was
not generated by light interaction with the SiPM but from thermal agitation or
tunnelling effect. At room temperature, the first effect gives the main contribution to
the so-called Dark Event, while at cryogenic temperatures tunnelling effect becomes
dominant. On the other hand, secondary avalanches generated due to some physical
effects in the primary avalanche are called correlated noise. Secondary and corre-
lated avalanche can be after-pulsing or optical cross-talk. The firsts occur in the same
cell of the primary avalanche due to later release of electrons trapped in impurities,
and it produces pulses with amplitude lower than the single-cell amplitude, while
the second one happens in a neighbour cell due to photons generated during the
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Fig. 3.13: Primary and Correlated noise signal shape as reported in [96]
primary avalanche. An exemplary illustration of how those effects appear in a typical
pulse shape is reported in Figure 3.13 [96].
From the analysis of the waveform of SiPM signal output when no light stimulus is
sent to the SiPM, it is possible to identify the features of a different kind of noise.
The main differences are in the time distance of correlated noise concerning the
primary event (a dark pulse in this case since no photons impinges on the sensor).
The analysis of those pulses allows to evaluate the noise figure for the SiPM, but
when it is not possible to digitise and analyse the whole waveform, Klanner et al.
[101] proposed a method to measure noise based on the difference in reconstructed
photon statistics, to the expected one from the light source.
3.4.1 Primary Noise
Primary-Noise rate, or Dark Counts Rate (DCR), is mainly determined by the SiPM
manufacturing. At room temperature, the Shockley-Read-Hall (SHR) generation
process is the main contribution to the trigger of spontaneous avalanches [99]. SRH
effects occur when electrons, or holes, pass from the valence to conduct band, and
vice versa, due to the thermal process. The mean lifetime of the SHR electrons
τSHR depends on the flaws and impurities of the epitaxial layer of the SiPM, so far
higher the number of impurities shorter is the τSHR, so far the free charge carrier
jumps occur more often. Moreover, DCR depends on the thickness of the depleted
region, being higher in SiPM with thicker active volume. In addition to that, another
mechanism like the Pole-Frankel and thermal-enhanced trap-assisted tunnelling,
related to the electric field characteristics inside the p-n junction, have the net effect
of a shorter τSHR, since they increase the frequency at which free charge carrier can
jump to the conduction band [102, 103]. In a given SiPM DCR thus depends directly
on the cell pitch, on the temperature, doubling every +10 degree variation, and
on the Vov. In fact, higher PDE, given by Vov variation to the temperature, makes
more probable the trigger of an avalanche from a free charge-carrier. In addition to
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that, an higher electric field enhances the SRH process and the thermal-enhanced
trap-assisted tunnelling effects as shown in 3.14.
Fig. 3.14: Exemplary plot of DCR vs Vov at different temperature as measured in [96]
The DCR then increases with the SiPM total area, and the number of cells, and
for latest SiPM commercially available it is in the order of dozens of kHz at room
temperature.
3.4.2 Optical Cross Talk
It has been demonstrated that during an avalanche in a SPAD the electrons with
energy close to the silicon bandgap of 1.14eV , namely the hot electrons, emit photons
in the visible range with a probability of ≈ 2.9 · 10−5 [93]. It means that within a
SiPM with a gain of ≈ 106, on average, 30 photons per avalanche are emitted, and
eventually detected by neighbourhood cells. The absorption of photons generated
due to an avalanche is called Optical Cross-Talk (OCT). OCT that occurs as sketched
in Figure 3.15, also called Prompt Cross Talk (pCT) are indistinguishable from a
situation where two or more cells fires simultaneously and independently. Direct
cross talk can spoil measurements for which the photon number resolving capability
have to be pushed to the limit, for example in Quantum Optics measurements [104,
105].
The delayed absorption of secondary avalanche photons is called Delay Cross-Talk
(DeCT). DeCT may happen due to two different physical phenomena: the photon
can be absorbed in the epi-layer of the SiPM, where residual low electric field slowly
drift the photoelectron into the avalanche region, or they can be reflected at SiPM
surface and re-enter the SiPM as shown schematically in Figure 3.16.
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Fig. 3.15: Sketch of prompt optical cross-talk mechanism.
Fig. 3.16: Sketch of the two delayed cross-talk mechanism: in the upper figure the ab-
sorption in the epi-layer while in the bottom one the back reflection of the
anti-reflective coating.
OCT probability increases with the Vov since both the higher gain increase the number
of photons generated by hot electrons, and the higher PDE being PT dependent on
the over-voltage. Optical trenches are implanted between the cells to stop photons
that escape the cell reducing the pCT. Moreover, the OCT probability increases
with the cell size according to the gain variation with the cell capacitance. The
measurement of the OCT probability can be performed looking at the ratio of the
rate of Dark pulses that presents an amplitude corresponding to more than one fired
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cell to the primary event rate. It can be quickly done retaining the event rate at
the increasing threshold as in Figure 3.17 and through Equation (3.9) measuring
the OTC probability known frequency for the threshold amplitude that corresponds
to 0.5 and 1.5 fired cell amplitude. This method is reliable since the probability to
have two simultaneous DCR (∆tDCR−DCR < 1ns) is less than 10−4 for 100 kHz DCR





Fig. 3.17: Threshold scan of SiPM performed at room temperature with no impinging light
as in [106].
3.4.3 After Pulse
Due to trapping centres caused by impurities in the p-n junction, some of the elec-
trons generated during the avalanche can be trapped and then re-emitted triggering
a second avalanche within the very same cell (Figure 3.18). This phenomenon is a
source of another correlated noise called After-Pulsing (AP). APs are signals with
a lower gain to the primary event since the Vov is not fully restored when the AP
takes place. Indeed, Vov depends on time, according to the model presented in
Section 3.1.1. The same happens to gain according to Equation (3.5). The time
distribution of the AP follows an exponential law, and the Equation (3.10) gives the
charge of an AP event that takes place at time tAP .
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Equation (3.10) accounts for the fact that at time tAP the cell Vov is not fully
recovered, so it detects the photons with a lower over-voltage and gain. The
amplitude dependence of the AP events is shown in Figure 3.19. It is essential to
notice that if an AP event occurs with time higher than the recovery time of the cell
(tAP ≥ 5τrecovery) the AP is indistinguishable from primary events. Indeed the later
avalanche may also occur if an electron was trapped outside the depletion layer, so
it takes time longer than τrecovery to enter the depleted region and thus trigger a
second avalanche. On the other hand, if it occurs with a shorter time, it is possible
to distinguish AP from DeCT looking at the amplitude distribution of subsequent
events, expected to be lower than one photoelectron for AP events. For those reasons
the after-pulse probability is modelled with a double exponential function as in
Equation (3.11), wherein the expression µAPf and µAPs are the mean number of
after-Pulses event per unit time accounting for the fast and slow process that gives
rise to AP.
nap(∆t) = µAPf · e
− ∆t
τAPf + µAPs · e
− ∆t
τAPs (3.11)
Fig. 3.18: Mechanism of After Pulsing.
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Fig. 3.19: After-pulse amplitude as function of time delay with respect to the primary event.
A first simple but yet robust method to evaluate the After-Pulsing is to evaluate
the excess of charge, over the charge from dark pulses, after a light stimulus. The
procedure, explained in [107], is based on the Central Limit Theorem and consists
in measuring the excess of charge, but it can account only for the slow component
of the after-pulsing τAPs . Another procedure has been developed and reported
in [108]. A waveform analysis was performed to tag events that present OCT or
AP and by analysing the temporal distribution of inter-arrival time and amplitude.
This procedure allows to overcome the experimental limits of 40ns for the AP
measurement of the CTL procedure, below which the tag of a pulse after the primary
one cannot be well identified, enhancing thus the sensibility and allowing for a
correct measurement of both the time constant typical of after-pulsing events.
3.4.4 Excess Noise Factor
The presence of Optical Cross Talk and After-pulsing modifies the probability distri-
bution of the detected photons for the probability distribution of the generated light.
It can be measured as the degradation of the SNR of the input signal (SNRin) to







The measurement can be conducted using a light source with a Poisson featuring
few photons as mean value (≈≤ 10). In this case, the ENF can be evaluated as in
Equation (3.13) [101]. SNRin is the ratio between the mean number of photon and
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its variance, for the Poisson distribution µ and
√
µ, while the SNRout refers to the












Where the notation ph.e. refers to the photoelectron distribution while the Poisson
refers to the light distribution. The mean value of the light distribution can be esti-
mated trough the probability of detecting no photons, as in Equations (3.14),(3.15),
and the σph.e., and µph.d. are evaluated from the distribution without any model
assumption. Moreover, the photon detection has to be synchronous with the light
emission.
P (0 p.e.) = e−µ (3.14)




where #i are the number of detected photons.
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4Comparison of Pulse Shape
Discrimination algorithms
In the previous chapter, several PSD algorithms were presented, and the results in
the last section were referred only to the Charge Comparison algorithm. A complete
study on the Pulse Shape Discrimination can not leave out the comparison of the
discriminating performances of different algorithms on the same datasets and in
different conditions. Such a comparison will also set the ground to compare fairly the
different front end electronics, set-ups and detectors relying on the best performing
discrimination technique. PSD algorithms performances comparison was obtained
using the most performing set-up according to outcomes of Chapter 7. The detection
unit is the outcome of a research project in collaboration with the Atomic Weapon
Establishment (AWE) in which the need for a summing circuit in order to increase
the photosensitive area by collecting light using multiple photomultipliers met the
need to preserve as much as possible the temporal development of electronics signal
shape. The detection unit used in this chapter is the outcome of a joint research
project with AWE held in 2015, having the goal to provide a sizeable sensitive area
Silicon Photomultiplier (up to 1 inch) preserving the time development of the signal
as of the scintillator characteristics.
4.1 Experimental Set-up
The detecting unit (Figure 4.1) consists in a bar of EJ 299-34 plastic scintillator
coupled to an array of 16 SiPMs. Each SiPM in the array has a dimension of 3×3mm2
with the main characteristics reported in Table 4.1. A custom front-end electronics
module supplies the bias to the sensor, sums-up the output from the SiPM array
elements and amplifies the total signal, feeding a waveform digitiser. The summing
circuits has been engineered in such a way all the channels are electrically decoupled
to avoid unbalancing in SiPM characteristics to affect the signal. The output from the
array has been digitised with a CAEN DT5720 module, sampling the signal at 250
MS/s with 12-bit resolution. The reported analysis is performed off-line on samples
of recorded events.
The electronic circuit to sum the 16 channels is based on a scheme that will be
detailed in Chapter 7. To summarise, it is a current summing scheme where all the
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channels are appropriately decoupled to avoid impedance mismatch influence on
signal quality.
Fig. 4.1: The experimental set-up based on the EJ 299-34 coupled with the Hamamatsu
s13361-3050AE-04 MPPC Array. The Hamamatsu C11204-01 supplies for the bias
voltage.
The EJ 299-34 is a plastic scintillator produced by Eljen Technologies sensitive to
fast neutrons and γs, with pulse shape discrimination capability. The temporal
development of the light generated by a γ interaction is a sum of 3 decaying expo-
nential curves with decay times of 15, 35 and 270 ns; the neutron interaction, i.e.
scattering with hydrogen nuclei, produces light with decay times of 15, 50 and 450
ns as reported on the data-sheet. The light yield is 7000 photons per MeVee. The
scintillator used for the present work has dimensions of 10 × 10 × 50mm3 and was
wrapped with Teflon tape to improve the light collection.
Hamamatsu S13361-3050AE - 04
Number of SiPMs 16 -
Single SiPM Size 3 x 3 mm2
Pixel Pitch 50 µm
VBD 50 V
Vop VBD + 5 V




Fill factor∗ 74 %
Dead Area∗∗ 0.2 mm
Tab. 4.1: Main characteristics of the SiPM array used for this analysis. ∗ Fill Factor referred
to a single SiPM. ∗∗ Dead area between two neighbouring SiPMs.
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4.2 Pulse Shape Discrimination algorithm
comparison
4.2.1 Energy Calibration
The radionuclides of interests emit γs with energies that predominantly interact
through the Compton Scattering [47] as the EJ 299-34 has a low atomic number. The
maximum deposited energy (Equation 4.1) for the Compton scattering interaction






Since the analytical form of the Compton Edge presents a sharp edge at the max-
imum deposited energy value [47], it has been modelled as a stepwise function
(Θ(x)). The resolution assumed to be Gaussian is convoluted with the Θ(x) to give
a complementary Gaussian error function, as shown in Eqn (4.4).
Θ(η) ⊗ G(η) =
∫ +∞
−∞
Θ(η − τ)G(τ)dτ (4.2)∫ η
−∞
Θ(η − τ)G(τ)dτ = 0 (4.3)








dη = erfc(η) (4.4)
When η is written as in Equation (4.5), x0 results to be the ADC channel correspond-
ing to the maximum deposited energy.





In order to verify the reliability of the Compton edge fit, the procedure was tested
with a CsI (10 × 10 × 15mm3) crystal, for which both the Compton scattering and
the photo-peak absorption interaction have non-negligible cross-sections. Along
with the calibration points obtained from the photo-peak energy, based on Gaussian
fit (red line in Figure 4.2), the channels corresponding to the maximum deposited
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energy were obtained after the erfc(x) fit (green line in Figure 4.2) as shown in
Figure 4.2. The R2 for the photo-peak calibration points is 0.9999. When the
maximum deposited energy channels are considered along with the photo-peak
calibration points the R2 decrease to 0.9997. The good agreement between the
maximum deposited energy points, and the calibration curve validates the procedure.
Moreover, it is appreciable the high dynamic range allowed by this experimental
set-up and summing scheme. Indeed it is possible to see in the 137Cs Spectrum how
the 30 keV line is well separated from the noise left over.
Fig. 4.2: On the left hand side is reported the 137Cs spectra obtained with the CsI crystal.
On the right hand side the calibration curve calculated with the use of the photo-
peak position (grey points). The maximum deposited energy points (blue points)
hold to the same calibration curve.
In Figure 4.3 Compton edge fit on 137Cs spectrum obtained with the EJ 299-34 is
reported along with the calibration curve for this plastic scintillator. The 60Co point
in fig. 4.3 refers to the average energy of the two maximum deposited energy related
to the 1.3 MeV and 1.1 MeV γs.
Fig. 4.3: On the left hand side the spectrum of the Compton edge of a 137Cs source collected
with the EJ 299-34. On the right hand side the calibration curve is reported.
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4.2.2 Optimisation procedure
Optimisation procedure involves the selection of the parameters that maximise the
F.o.M.of the neutron-γ discrimination in the energy window between 1-1.5 MeV. The
F.o.M.was calculated, through automatic scan and fitting of PSD distributions, over
a set of parameters to find the ones maximising F.o.M.. The output of optimisation
scan for PT and CC algorithms is shown in Figure 4.4; the value of F.o.M.is reported
accordingly to the colour legend, where X and Y axis are parameters tdelay and tint
values corresponding to reported F.o.M..
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Fig. 4.4: The top figure reports the output for the optimisation procedure applied to the PT
algorithm, while the bottom one reports the result for the CC algorithm. The area
in the parameters space where FOM is > 2 (black dashed line) is ≈ 4000 µs2 for
the PT and ≈ 2150 µs2 for the CC.
The PT algorithm applied using tdelay = 160ns and tint = 6400ns returns PSD values
in function of energy as plotted in Figure 8.15. Along with the 252Cf source results
for the 60Co and for the 137Cs were also plotted. The distribution of the PSD in the
energy range 1 - 1.5 MeV is reported in Figure 4.5 where the FOM of 2.49 ± 0.02 was
calculated on the 252Cf data.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4.5: The distribution of the PSD is shown as a function of energy for the 252Cf , the
60Co and for the 137Cs (a). Non-linearity and saturation effects, due to the non-
linear region of the amplifier, occurs for energy greater than 2.5 MeV. Distribution
of the PSD in the energy interval 1 - 1.5 MeV with superimposed two Gaussian fits
(b).
Algorithms were compared on the base of the F.o.M.in different energy windows
and on the energy value for a F.o.M.= 1.27, namely the minimum energy for an
acceptable gamma/n discrimination. The comparison is reported in Figure 4.6
while the Emin is reported in Table 4.2 together with the F.o.M.(E)with E ∈
[1; 1.5]MeV .
Fig. 4.6: FOM in different energy windows for the compared algorithms.
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PT CC PGA CT
FOM 2.49 ± 0.02 2.14 ± 0.01 1.32 ± 0.01 1.09 ±0.02
min Energy 200 keV 300 keV 1 MeV 1.5 MeV
Tab. 4.2: FOM in the energy window 1-1.5 MeV and the minimum energy that allows for a
FOM greater than 1.3
The comparison outlines that the Peak - Tail algorithm results in better discrimination
and improved stability. Figure 4.4 shows the optimisation output for the PT and CC
algorithm; from these plots, it is possible to see that the first guarantees optimal
performance over a more extensive set of parameter values. As observable that
measure F.o.M.stability it was chosen the area in the parameters space where the
F.o.M.is above 2. With an area that exceeds 4000µs2, the PSDP T algorithm shows
better stability with respect to the 2150µs2 area measured for the PSDCC algorithm.
The reason for these results is not apparent, and it is, moreover, counterintuitive. So
far, numerical simulations were used to investigate more profoundly this result.
4.3 Simulation of a PSD scintillator
In order to understand the phenomenology that makes the Peak-Tail algorithm
the best performing among the ones compared in the previous section, a Matlab
simulation was used to simulate the scintillation light profile of the EJ-299/34
read out by a SiPM. The simulation also accounts for signal shaping by Front End
Electronics. The core of the simulation is based on the code presented in [108, 93]
and it accounts for the SiPM response to a burst of light plus SiPM’s stochastic effects.
The simulation parameters are SiPM dimension and the single-cell pitch (from where
the total number of cell Ncells is calculated), the DCR, the Cross-Talk probability
εxt and the after-pulsing probability εAP and τAP . The simulation is based on the
following steps:
• generate Np.e. photons from a Poisson distribution with a mean number of
photons µp.e.;
• uniformly Distribute Np.e. photons on a square grid (SiPM sensor size) with
Ntot cells available;
• for each cell a cross-talk event is generated in the neighbour cells with a
probability εxt;
• for each fired cell (primary + cross talk) an after pulse is generated with
probability εap.
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Fig. 4.7: Example of SiPM with 100 cells and 6 fired cell, of which red ones are primary
event, the yellow one is a primary event plus an After Pulse and the white one is a
Cross-Talk event.
• for each fired cell corresponding to a primary event or a cross-talk, a single
electron response function is generated at time t = 0.
• every after pulse event is generated with a delay time (tAP ), with respect the
primary event following an exponential distribution with characteristic time
τap, a single electron response with a amplitude A(tAP ) = (1 − e
− tAP
τap )), that
is a fraction of the primary event charge.
• all the signals are summed together, and the output response of the SiPM is
produced.
The result of a single iteration is shown in Figure 4.7, and the process is repeated
Nev times to generate a full dataset comprising Nev events.
The single electron response is an analytical function of the form reported in Equa-
tion 4.6, and the simulation was modified, introducing a temporal distribution on the
photon arrival time to simulate the scintillation light profile. The transfer function
of the front end electronics was not analytically derived but was simulated instead
through a digital band-pass FIR filter with custom cut-frequency. When this module
is added to the simulation, the cut frequency represents an additional used-defined
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parameter for the simulation. Simulation has been furthermore modified to consider
the delayed cross talks probability separately from the prompt one. The simulation
is quite flexible since it allows to simulate the light time profile with more than one-
time component and to simulate the response of different front end by considering
the bandwidth.
4.3.1 SiPM and Front End Electronics
The single-cell response was modelled as the sum of 3 exponential functions ac-
counting for the rising edge and for the two falling edges (Equation (4.6)) time
constants. The parameters chosen for the simulation are reported in Table 4.3. They
were chosen to be close to the measurement of the single electron response of an
s13360 series SiPM by Hamamatsu.




τrise − P1 · e
− t





Parameter used for simulation
Parameter PR P1 P2 τrise τfall1 τfall2
Value 1 1 0.2 0.2ns 0.3ns 30ns
DCR CrossTalk (prompt/delayed) Afterpulses
100 kHz 3%/7% 2%
Tab. 4.3: Values of the parameters of the (4.6), and level of SiPM spurious effects.
Figure 4.8 shows the comparison between the simulate signal Single Electron Re-
sponse and pulse acquired with the DT5720 digitiser. The digital filter used was an
FIR filter with 40MHz bandwidth and a cut at 50MHz, similar to the summing circuit
characteristics. The signal was evaluated on a time scale with a granularity of 10
picoseconds and then resampled to obtain the same sampling rate of the digitiser
(250MHz).
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Fig. 4.8: Comparison of a simulated signal with a real signal of a single photo-electron.
4.3.2 Neutron-γ simulated signals
The photon distribution in time has been simulated with two decay constants (35
(γ) and 50 (neutron) plus a second decay time of 276 or 470 ns respectively), and
the temporal distribution of the photons was tuned to simulate a response similar
to the one of the EJ-276. However, to better understood the effect of the different
ration of prompt and delayed component, signals with different time component
ratio were simulated. Signals showed in Figure 4.9 were simulated with a 95% of
the fast component and a 5% of the slow one.
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Fig. 4.9: Simulated signal of a γ and neutron induced pulse at the end of acquisition chain.
4.3.3 Algorithm Comparison
1000 γ and 1000 neutron pulses were simulated, with 2500 photoelectrons per each
pulse. This number was chosen assuming that the light from 1 MeV ee deposited
energy suffers from a 10% of light loss from the scintillator surface and considering
the nominal SiPM PDE of 40%, as reported in the data-sheet.
The Kolmogorov Smirnov Test (KS) was used as a qualifier to compare the difference
in signals when the area or peak amplitude normalisation is applied. KS measures
the maximum difference in the cumulative of two distributions. The distribution
considered are the simulated signal for γ and neutron interaction. A higher value
of the KS test indicates a more considerable difference between the two signals,
suggesting that the normalisation with the highest KS may allow for the better
F.o.M.. The test was applied with different ratios of prompt/delayed components.
In all simulations, the KS indicates the peak-amplitude normalisation as the one
enhancing the difference in the two signals. Figure 4.10(b) and Figure 4.10(a) report
the cumulative sum of a neutron signal (blue line) and a γ signal (red line) along
with the KS result for two opposite scenario: the 5/95% and the 95/%5 ratio.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4.10: K-S test for a simulated signal where (a) the delay component predominates and
(b) the prompt one does.
The two PSD algorithms were applied to the dataset, setting integration limits for
the tail integration starts about 5 prompt τs after peak and lasts up to 5 delayed
component τs (tdelay = 300ns and tint = 1500ns) as shown in Figure 4.9. In
Figure 4.11(a) and Figure 4.11(b) the distribution of the PSD parameters evaluated
according to (2.7) and (2.8) are reported. Mean value and FWHMs for the two
distribution have been calculated after a Gaussian fit.
4.3 Simulation of a PSD scintillator 78
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4.11: PSD distribution for the PSDP T (a) and PSDCCM (b) parameter in simulated
signals with 95%/5% component ratio.
The F.o.M.indicates that peak normalisation shows better separation (F.o.M.of
1.38 ± 0.1) with respect to area normalisation (F.o.M.of 1.00 ± 0.11). The result is in
accord with the expectation of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The F.o.M., in favour
of the PSDP T algorithm, decreases as the ratio of two light components changes,
leading to a better F.o.M.when the long light component prevails. In Figure 4.12
the F.o.M.are reported for both algorithm in case of 05%/95% component ratio
with a F.o.M.of 4.45 ± 0.54 for the integral normalisation vs a 3.31.0.35 F.o.M.for
the peak amplitude normalisation.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 4.12: PSD distribution for the PSDCCM (a) and PSDP T (b) parameter in simulated
signals with 05%/95%component ratio.
F.o.M.has been evaluated for both algorithm at different light ratios, and the results
are reported in Figure 4.13 where the errors bar are estimated propagating the
error given by the fit procedure. PSDP T results in a better F.o.M.as long as the
prompt light component dominates over the long one. Once this condition no
longer holds, the area normalisation results in better discrimination. The reason
for the better discrimination, in some conditions, after the peak normalisation, is
yet to be understood. The hypothesis that will be tested in the next chapter are the
followings:
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• the peak amplitude suffers less from the noise, so far the information brought
by the peak is less affected by noise with respect to the integral
• the delayed components (that brings the information about the particle nature)
are tested against the prompt components given that the peak is built-up
mainly by the prompt photons.
Fig. 4.13: F.o.M.as function of prompt/long ratio for both the PSDCCM and PSDP T
discrimination parameters.
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5Noise estimation in Peak
Amplitude or Charge Collection
Chapter 4 suggested that the use of peak amplitude instead of the integral could
improve the pulse shape discrimination. The hypothesis is that the peak height
can be used to measure the fast component, expected to be equal for a γ and a
neutron with the same deposited energy, so far such a normalisation will enhance
the difference in the tail of the scintillation signal.
Ina first place, through low light signals (less than 50 photons from a pulsed LED
source, sensibly less than the scintillator Light Yeld) it had been qualified the elec-
tronic noise associated with the peak amplitude or with the charge integral. With
the same light amount, the statistic fluctuations related to the different procedures
have been qualified. This procedure was carried out to disentangle the effects of
the scintillators and the detector. Indeed, beyond the noise figures, the comparison
between the information conveyed by the use of the peak value of the signal and the
integrated charge/pulse was based on the resolution power, namely the maximum
number of different peaks in a multi-photon spectrum recorded with a 1.3x1.3mm2
SiPM in above-mentioned low light condition.
The final step of the investigation involved the measurement in case a Scintillator
is used. A reliable figure of merit can arise from the comparison of gamma spectra
taken in different conditions. The SiPM in use was changed to a 6x6mm2 sensor,
interfaced to CsI(Tl) and LYSO scintillating crystals. Spectra were recorded using a
137Cs nuclide and the assessment based on the resolution of the photo-peak at 662
keV. Measurements were performed with the slow CsI(Tl) scintillator and a fast LYSO
(decay time 40ns), to account for the effects related to fast and slow components of
the PSD scintillators.
Through numerical simulations, the impact of the time distribution of the emit-
ted photons on the peak value build-up was measured and used to reinforce the
understanding of experimental results about peak-tail algorithm performances.
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5.1 Material and Methods
The analysis was conducted with SiPMs produced by HAMAMATSU Photonics,
with the main features reported in Table 5.1. Small area sensors (1.3x1.3mm2,
s13360-1350) were used for detecting light pulses emitted by a LED source and
conveyed on the surface of the sensor by an optical fibre. Larger area sensor
(6x6mm2, s13360-6050) was interfaced to scintillating crystals and used for γ ray
detection. The scintillating crystals used were a CsI(Tl) and an LYSO with a volume
of 6x6x15mm3.
S13360-1350CS S13360-6050CS
Cell pitch 50 50 µm
VBD 53 53 V
Vop VBD+3 VBD+3 V
Gain 1.7 · 106 1.7 · 106 -
Terminal Capacitance 60 1280 pF
DCR 90 2000 kcps
Cross-Talk 3 3 %
After Pulse N.A. N.A. %
PDEmax 40 40 %
Tab. 5.1: Main figures of the sensors in use, as of the vendor’s specifications. Vbd identifies
the breakdown voltage and Vop the suggested operational voltage. The reported
PDE corresponds to the peak value ( λ = 450nm). Figures refer to an operating
temperature T=25◦C
A custom-designed circuit amplified the SiPM signal with twin amplification at
12/34 dB gain and 37 MHz bandwidth. A CR-RC circuit shaped the signal with
time constants of 25ns and 17ns respectively for the differentiating and integrating
circuits. The amplified signal was sampled using a CAEN DT5730 digitiser with 500
Msps sampling frequency, 250 MHz bandwidth and 14-bit digitisation over a 2V
input range.
Fig. 5.1: Block scheme of the Experimental Set-Up.
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Light pulses were generated at 1 MHz frequency by a PicoQuant PDL-800B module
driving a blue LED, emitting bursts of photons with a sub-ns duration not exceeding
twenty photons per shot in the used configuration.
5.2 Low Light Measurement
The impact of SiPM’s stochastic effects, namely DCR, Cross-Talks and Afterpulses, was
measured with a procedure that accounts for the different contribution independently
with respect of the cell-to-cell gain variation. The sensor is exposed to a blue light
from an LED conveyed to the SiPM (1.3x1.3mm2, s13360-1350) by an optical fibre. A
multi-photon spectrum was recorded by collecting the charge corresponding to each
pulse. The first assessment of noise contribution from the cell-to-cell gain variation
to the spectra collected with the peak or with the integral, was accomplished by
reducing the recorded dataset to the subset corresponding to a single fired cell and
comparing the σ of the 1-ph.e. peaks.
Fig. 5.2: Signal before the baseline subtraction. The red line shows search interval for the
DCR in the pre-integration window. The orange one identifies the integration
window of 124ns while the green one the peak search windows of 30ns.
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Digital charge integration signal window ∆t was optimised to provide the maximum
value of integral/σintegral(1p.e.) found to be ∆t = 124ns. At this integration time,
the relative error of the 1 photoelectron distribution signal-to-noise ratio is 6.6 ±
0.6%.
The standard deviation of the distribution of the peak amplitude of the signals is
influenced by two effects impacting in opposite directions: on the one hand, residual
variations in the cell-to-cell multiplication process are expected to make it larger
concerning the baseline fluctuations by the electronics noise; on the other hand,
since the peak value is always retained, the order statistic applies, and fluctuations
shall be reduced. The peak search window was reduced to 30ns interval, to correctly
identify the peak getting rid of after-pulses and delayed cross-talks. The recorded
data correspond to σpeak(1p.e.) = 9.4ADC, to be compared to σbaseline = 6.6ADC,
indicating a prevailing effect due to the cell-to-cell gain variations. The signal-to-
noise ration of 1p.e. distribution is 6.6 ± 0.1%
In Figure 5.3, the two distribution of 0 and 1 photoelectron obtained with the two
procedure is reported.
Fig. 5.3: distribution of the electronic noise and the one photoelectron signal. The noise in
the peak amplitude is shifted with respect to the zero, and it is narrower since it
follows a distribution given by the order statistics of the maxima as the maximum
amplitude is always retained even in empty events.
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As from those results, the performances of the two strategies are comparable, with a
little bias towards the peak amplitude strategy.
5.2.1 Multi Photon Spectra comparison
Even if the performances on the single photoelectron signals are equal differences
are evident in the quality of the multi-photon spectrum. Indeed the peak amplitude
distribution is not affected by stochastic effects, namely delayed cross-talk and after-
pulsing. In contrast, those effects contribute to the integral case spoiling the photon
number resolution. The net result is a misidentification photoelectron number. A
pile-up rejection method will not do it since the overall probability of having an event
affected by a secondary avalanche increases with the number of primary avalanches.
A rejection would then not be uniform with the number of photoelectrons resulting
in an alteration of the photon statistics, and this may not always be the desidered
outcome. In Figure ??, the effect is shown: the left panel shows the overlaid spectra,
while Figure 5.5 reports the scatter plots of the number of identified photons, event
by event, using either the charge or the peak amplitude. The natural classification in
a discrete number of fired cells is spoiled by random occurrences in the integration
window, while the peak amplitude-based spectra show a better peak to valley ratio;
it is expected a reduction of the maximum number of resolved peaks in the case of
integral with respect to the peak amplitude since the events in between the peaks
increase the RMS2.
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Fig. 5.4: Multiphoton spectra, considering the charge or the amplitude, in logarithmic scale.
Fig. 5.5: Scatter plot of the number of p.e. measured with the integral or the peak ampli-
tude.
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With a slight modification to the Sparrow criterion (Equation (3.1)) the limit of two
photoelectrons as no longer distinguishable is when the FWHM of the distribution is
higher than 1.
FWMH ≥ 1 ⇒ No distinguishable photoelectrons (5.1)
σ2 was measured as the variance of N th photoelectron distribution considering
asymmetric intervals that start at -3σ of the single Gaussian peak up to the next
photoelectron (Figure 5.6).
Fig. 5.6: Intervals to evaluate the σ of the N th peak
σ2(Np.e.) is expected to increase linearly with the number of p.e. N , and when
FWHM is equal to one (Equation 5.3) photoelectrons are considered too overlapped
to be distinguishable. Solving Equations (5.2)- (5.7) it is possible to measure the
maximum number N through a linear fit on σ2(N) data.
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σ2(Np.e.) = σ20 + Nσ2cell−to−cell (5.2)
N : 1 ≥ 2.355σ2(Np.e.) (5.3)
σ2(N) = mN + q (5.4)
σ20 = q (5.5)










In equation 5.2 noise is given by electronic fluctuation σ0, and the cell-to-cell gain
variation σcell−to−cell. Electronic noise as a fraction of photoelectron can be either
measured by q or by σ0.
Fig. 5.7: σ2(p.e.) measured as the RMS of the distribution of photoelectrons for the integral
and for the peak amplitude based measurement.
From this analysis, the number of resolved photons with digital charge integration
is 45, while it is 82 for the peak amplitude. Those numbers were calculated by
feeding fit results reported in Table 5.4 in Equation (5.7). Indeed, not only the peak
amplitude allows to reconstruct the photon statistics in case of low light intensity,
but also it allows to improve the photon-number resolution since it gets rid of
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after-pulses and delayed cross-talk without altering the photon statistics as a pile-up
rejection algorithm would do.
Parameter Integral Peak Amplitude
m 0.00391 ± 2.724 · 10−4 0.00216 ± 7.398 · 10−5
q 0.00225 ± 6.40 · 10−4 0.00217 ± 2.398 · 10−4
σ0 0.0033 0.0020
N 45 82
Relative error 6.6 ± 0.6% 6.6 ± 0.1%
Tab. 5.2: Linear fit parameter of the σ(Np.e.) for the peak amplitude and the integral
expressed in photoelectrons at Vbias = 53.5V .
As additional qualifier Excess Noise Factor (Equation 5.8), as defined in [101], have
been evaluated.






where µZP is the mean value of the photoelectron distribution evaluated by the prob-
ability to detect zero photons (f0) under the hypothesis of a Poissonian distribution
(µZP = −ln(f0)). µMI , σMI are the model-independent evaluation of mean value
and variance of the photoelectron distribution. The ENF and maximum distinquish-
able peaks are evaluated at two bias: 53.5V (+2.5VOV ) and at 55.5V (+4.5VOV ), since
at higher bias the PDE increases but also the amount of Cross-Talks and Afterpulses
probability. The value are reported in Table 5.3 for the measurement performed at
two different bias voltages.
53.5 55.5
Peak 1.042 ± 0.002 1.036 ± 0.001
Integral 1.066 ± 0.002 1.093 ± 0.002
Tab. 5.3: EFN for the peak or the integral at two different bias voltage.
The number of distinguishable photoelectrons was evaluated at Vbias = 55.5V .
According to the ENF analysis, a lower number of distinguishable photons is
expected.
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Parameter Integral Peak Amplitude
m 0.0125 ± 7.344 · 10−4 0.002895 ± 1.66 · 10−5
q 0.00101 ± 2.2 · 10−4 0.000289 ± 5.33 · 10−4
σ0 0.0033 0.0020
N 15 63
Relative error 9.7 ± 0.1% 5.0 ± 0.%1
Tab. 5.4: Linear fit parameter of the σ(Np.e.) for the peak amplitude and the integral
expressed in photoelectrons at Vbias = 55.5V .
All the numerical figures chosen to compare the two approaches showed that peak
amplitude would not only be equivalent to the use of the integral, but also it suffers
less from the noise and stochastic effects, and better exploit the photon number
resolution power of the SiPM.
5.3 Quality of γ spectra
A CsI(Tl) and LYSO scintillators with a volume of 6x6x15mm3, produced by Hilger
Crystals were exposed to a 137Cs γ source to measure the quality when the peak
amplitude or the integral are retained in a condition where lots of photons hit the
sensor. Scintillators had all the sides polished and coated by a diffusive epoxy layer
on the faces not interfaced to the sensor, whit their main characteristics reported
in Table 5.5. The 6x6 mm2 area SiPM, interfaced to LYSO and CsI(Tl) scintillators,
recorded events and spectra were reconstructed by using the peak value or the
integral of the signals. As a figure of merit, the resolution on the 662 keV photo-peak
was retained. The 12 dB branch of the CR-RC amplifier had been used to avoid
saturation due to the peak amplitude. It has been verified that the shaping time and
the peak resolution of the 12 dB branch are equal to the 34dB one by collecting the
spectrum of CsI(Tl) with the two branches since peak amplitude of CsI(Tl) signals
lies below the saturation.
CsI(Tl) LYSO
ρ 4.51 7.1 g/cm2
λpeak 550 420 nm
Light Yield 54000 40000 ph/MeV
τ 650/3500 37 ns
Tab. 5.5: Main Characteristics of CsI(Tl) and LYSO scintillators
The integration gate ∆t for the light signal has been chosen as the one that maximises
the resolution of the 662 keV photo-peak in the spectrum, being ∆tCsI(T l) = 10µs
and ∆tLY SO = 500ns. The two spectra are reported in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9.
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Spectra collected with the CsI(Tl) shows a worse resolution from peak amplitude with
respect to one obtained the charge integral. Spectra reconstructed with the LYSO, on
the other hand, show no appreciable difference between the two strategies.
Fig. 5.8: Comparison of the spectrum obtained retaining the peak amplitude or the integral
of the signal with the CsI(Tl) crystal
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Fig. 5.9: Comparison of the spectrum obtained retaining the peak amplitude or the integral
of the signal with the LYSO crystal
The result reflects the difference in the time development of the light from two
scintillators, leading to a different number of photons that contributes to the peak
build-up. This hypothesis was verified by means of a numerical simulation. The
parameters used in the previous Chapter (Chapter 4) have been tuned to reproduce
the scintillation profile of CsI(Tl) and LYSO crystals. In the two Figures, 5.10 and
5.11, the average signal is reported along with a single signal. 5400 photons,
corresponding to a signal of 100keV , was generated for the CsI(Tl), and distributed
over two scintillating light component of τprompt = 600ns (80%) and τlong = 3.5µs
(20%). 4000 photons were generated with a τLY SO = 37ns to match the 100
keV energy in the LYSO simulation. The ratio of photons that contribute to the
peak amplitude was evaluated by counting the number of detected photons at time
t < tpeak.
In CsI(Tl) only 7.25 ± 0.37% of photons contributes to the peak while in the case
of LYSO 69.5 ± 1.3% of photons contributes to peak, reducing the fluctuation and
allowing for an estimation of the peak amplitude that better reflects the total amount
of light produced.
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Fig. 5.10: Simulated CsI(Tl) signal.
Fig. 5.11: Simulated LYSO signal.
5.4 The fast component in PSD scintillators
It is clear from the above-presented measurements and simulations that the peak
amplitude is a proper measurement of the scintillation light when the components
are such that a high fraction of the total light contributes to the peak built-up. In
this sense, it can be verified with the same simulation if in the PSD scintillators the
5.4 The fast component in PSD scintillators 94
prompt component contribute mostly to the build-up; It is easy to verify whether
this is true or not in the simulation since it is possible to access to the arrival time of
every photon.
Fig. 5.12: Percentage of photons that arrive before the maximum when the prompt/delay
proportion is 95/5.
As can be seen in Figures 5.12 and Figure 5.13 the peak is well defined when the
fast component comprises the majority of the photons. On the other hand, when
the long component prevails, the low statistics of photons increases the errors in the
peak amplitude determination. These two conditions are similar to the one obtained
with the simulation of the CsI(Tl) and LYSO scintillators, suggesting that the peak
amplitude measurement better identifies the fast component.
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Fig. 5.13: Percentage of photons that arrive before the maximum when prompt/delay
proportion is 5/95.
The ratio of the photons that arrive before the time of the peak is reported in
Table 5.6, for prompt and long components at different simulated prompt/long
ratio. Differences between F.o.M.for (2.7) and (2.8) are in favour of the peak
normalisation when the prompt light is sensitively higher than the slow component
in the prompt component. When the Fast/Total ratio becomes comparable to the
Slow/Total ratio, the F.o.M.indicates that the total charge normalisation allows for
achieving better results.
Component Ratio Fast Slow Fast/total Slow/total
95/5 71.13 ± 0.92% 9.86 ± 2.66% 59.42 ± 0.93% 0.49 ± 0.13%
80/20 71.33 ± 1.01% 8.82 ± 1.25% 57.07 ± 0.81% 1.76 ± 0.25%
50/50 72.27 ± 1.31% 9.07 ± 0.80% 36.14 ± 0.65% 4.53 ± 0.4%
20/80 76.84 ± 1.81% 10.32 ± 0.69% 15.37 ± 0.38% 8.26 ± 0.56
5/95 88.60 ± 2.81 25.42 ± 0.87 4.43 ± 0.71 24.15 ± 0.63
Tab. 5.6: Ratio of photons from fast ad slow components that contributes to the peak build
up.
Peak height presents advantages in case of low light detection, while when it comes
to the scintillation light is effective only if fluctuations of the peak are small. Indeed,
the situation when the number of photons that contribute to the peak build-up is the
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majority of the total generated photons. The physical meaning of peak-tail algorithm
is then supported by the experimental results and simulations that showed how,
through peak amplitude, a better estimation of fast components is achieved when
the ratio of the components is in favour of the fast one.
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6Role of Light collection on PSD
In the last chapter, it was shown that light has a primary role in the performances of
Pulse shape discrimination algorithm. In particular, the ratio of the prompt/delayed
light was related to the performances of the different discrimination algorithms. The
final step in the investigation of the parameters affecting the PSD performance is
a study on the impact of the detected scintillating light intensity. The main goal
of this chapter is to calibrate the detector response in photo-electrons, matching
the F.o.M.with the amount of collected light instead of energy. In order to act on
the detected scintillating light, it was changed the Vbias, and the PDE consequently.
However, the incidence of stochastic effects changes with voltage, and it has an
impact on the detected light, as shown in the previous chapter. It is still a matter of
decoupling the effects, and to so, a small sensor area coupled to the LED pulsed light
was used in order to use the MultiPhoton peak spectrum to measure the Vbd, the
gain and the stochastic effects for different Vov. It was then possible to retrieve the
number of detected photons for different Vov, accounting for the stochastics effect, by
coupling the sensor to a PSD capable scintillator. The optimal parameters were found
for each different bias voltage, and the F.o.M.has been evaluated in different energy
windows. Notably, the minimum discrimination energy strongly dependent on the
Vov, and it corresponds to a fixed number of detected photo-electrons, independently
with respect to the bias voltage. This results clarified the relation between the
F.o.M.and the collected light.
6.1 Charaterisation of the SiPM
6.1.1 SiPM Gain
A 6x6mm2 SiPM produced by HPK (s13360-6050c), whose main features are re-
ported in Table 5.1, was used to perform this analysis. The sensor was illuminated by
a blue light generated from a sub-ns LED driver PicoQuant PDL-800, as in Chapter 5,
and signals were acquired synchronously. A three-stage inverting amplifier amplified
siPM with gain that ranges from 1 to 50 dB, the SP5600 Power Supply and Ampli-
fication Unit (PSAU) by CAEN. The signal was then digitised via a CAEN DT5720
Desktop Digitiser, 250Msps, 2V input range and 12 Bit resolution (Figure 6.1) and
integrated offline for 350ns.
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Fig. 6.1: Block scheme of the experimental set-up
An exemplary multi-photon spectrum is reported in Figure 6.2. The SiPM’s gain
is measured by the ∆pp, namely the distance in ADC channels in the multi-photon
spectrum, via Equation (6.1).
G = ∆pp · ADCc.r.
qe
(6.1)




= Vpp · ∆t
Rin · 2Nbit · GP SAU
(6.2)
and
• Vpp is the dynamic range of the digitiser;
• Rin is the digitiser input impedance;
• NBits is the digitiser bit resolution;
• ∆t is the digitiser sampling period (1/250Mhz = 4ns);
• GP sau is the gain of the PSAU;
• qe is the elementary charge.
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Fig. 6.2: Multi photon peak spectrum measured with GP SAU =32, Vbias = 55.5V integrating
the light signal for 350ns.
Equation (6.2) means that SiPM signal, that is in current, is read as a voltage drop
across the input resistance Rin in the digitiser. Conversion factor ADCc.r. gauge the
voltage step, of 1 ADC corresponding to the current through the Rin resistors in
Coulomb.
6.1.2 BreakDown voltage
∆pp depends on the Vov by its relation to gain expressed in Equation 6.1. The value
of the Vbd was measured from the ∆pp(Vbias) curve, extrapolating the voltage for
which the ∆pp is equal to 0. The values of ∆pp were measured with a GP SAU = 32dB
and Vbias that ranges from 53.3 to 58.5V in steps of 0.5V . The value of Vbd is then
the intercept of linear regression reported in Figure 6.3 at T = 20.1o. Its value
isVbd = 52.25V ± 0.02V .
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Fig. 6.3: Determination of the Vbd by looking at the Vbias that results in ∆pp = 0.
6.1.3 Effective cross-talk
To properly evaluate the PDE of the sensor, the number of primary events has to be
measured. Even if it is not possible, event by event, to determine the number of
primary fired cells, it is, however, possible to statistically correct the mean value of
detected photo-electrons taking in account the cross-talk and afterpulses probability.
Indeed, the net effect of cross-talk and after-pulses is to increase the mean value
of the photon number distribution. Following this assumption, also expressed in
[101] the stochastic effect impact can be measured as the excess of measured photo-
electrons with respect to the real ones. The problem of measuring the number of
primary fired cells can be solved if the light source follows a Poissonian distribution.
In this case, the primary photo-electrons can be measured as in the Equation (3.15)
as the probability to detect no photons.
Once the number of expected photons by a pure Poisson statistics and the measured
ones are computed, it is possible to estimate than an "effective" cross-talk εeffxt from
Equation 6.3 and 6.4.
µMI = µZP / · (1 − εeffxt ) (6.3)
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Fig. 6.4: εeffxt as function of the Vov.
6.1.4 Non amplified gain
Since it is not possible to obtain a multi-photon peak spectrum without amplifying
the signal, a direct measurement of the ∆pp is not possible. However, by the following
procedure, it is possible to measure the ∆pp(gain = 1) indirectly. In a first place, at
the nominal voltage of Vov = +3V , the ∆pp has been evaluated for different gains
ranging from 20 to 38 dB. Light pulses did non exceed ten photons per spill, while
PSAU amplification range has not been fully exploited to avoid output saturation.
By means of linear regression, the ∆pp(gain) function can be evaluated and the
∆pp(gain = 1) can be extrapolated.
A second method to measure the ∆pp(gain = 1) is to increase the photon flux to
hundreds of photons per spill, then measure the average number of photoelectrons
when the gain is set for a value for which ∆pp is known. It is possible to measure






after the correction of the measured < ADChl > value considering the stochastich
effects term εeffxt .
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A gain = 1x results in a different ∆pp and < ADChl > values, but Nphehl did not
change. So far, it is possible to measure the ∆pp(gain = 1) by inverting Equa-
tion (6.5)
The results of the two measurements are reported in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6.
From those measurements, the value at gain = 1x can be extrapolated, and Table 6.1
reports the measured values.
Fig. 6.5: ∆pp as function of gain for Vov = +3V with low light intensity (<20 photons per
spill) pulses and GP SAU ∈ [20; 38]dB
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Fig. 6.6: ∆pp as functiton of gain for Vov = +3V with high light intensity pulses (≈ 100
photons per spill) and GP SAU ∈ [1; 20]dB
Parameter Low Light High Light
m 7.06 ± 0.36 252.8 ± 7.2
q 3.01 ± 2.3 99.98 ± 8.51
Tab. 6.1: Parameter of the scan in Gain fit.
Given the ∆pp at Gain = 20dB it is possible to measure the primary photoelectrons
number Nphehl = 35. ∆pp from the high light measurement results to be 7.21 ± 0.35
that is comparable with the value obtained from the measurements at low light.
Since the PSAU is AC coupled, while the direct input of the digitiser is DC coupled,
a gain conversion factor GCF was measured to obtain the value of ∆directpp . This
conversion factor kpsau/digi is measured by the ratio of < ADChl > measured with
direct signal and < ADChl > measured after attenuating by 1db, via an HP desktop
analogue attenuator, the PSAU signal with gain=1db.
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Fig. 6.7: Ratio of the two light distribution with no amplification collected with the DT5720
either directly or after the PSAU amplification stage at 1dB and an attenuator at
1dB
∆directpp have been evaluated from Equation (6.6) under the hypothesis that a scale
factor can model differences between AC and DC coupling.
∆directpp = (∆ACpp · GCF · kDC/AC). (6.6)
where the GCF is the gain conversion factor and kDC/AC is the ratio between the
AC/DC coupled < ADChl > values
Once the ∆directpp is measured for one value of Vov, it is possible to evaluate ∆relpp (Vov)





A linear fit was then applied on the value of ∆pp(Vov) for the low light measurement
at different bias, ant the ∆directpp (Vov) was obtained multiplying the ∆pp(Vov = +3V )
for the ∆relpp (Vov).
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Fig. 6.8: Fit to the Equation 6.7 for the relative ∆pp variation as function of Vov
Parameter Value
m 0.3333 ± 0.0016
q 0 ± 0.0066
Tab. 6.2: Parameter of the fit in Figure 6.8
The ∆directpp as function of Vov is reported in Figure 6.9, calculated as in Equa-
tion 6.8.
∆directpp (Vov) = ∆directpp (Vov = 3) · (Vovmrel + qrel) (6.8)
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Fig. 6.9: ∆directpp as function of Vov.
6.1.5 PDE relative
The value of the ∆pp was measured along with the impact of stochastic effects for all
the Vov. It is now possible to measure the relative PDE by measuring the difference
in detected photons per each Vov accounting for effects mentioned above. It can
be measured in at least two ways measuring the PDE as variation in the number of
photo-electrons under a constant light stimulus:
• given a fixed light intensity, ≈ 100 photons per spill, the < ADChl > is
measured and corrected for the εeffxt for different Vov and the relative PDE is





• at low light intensity, ≈ 20 photons per spill, the µZP is evaluated as in
Equation 3.15 and the relative PDE. evaluated as in Equation 6.9,
where the Obs is either < ADChl > or µZP . Both of the methods should give similar
results, and in addition to the PDE measurement, the comparison qualifies the use of
εeffxt correction factor since the µZP based method is not affected by any correction
for stochastic effects. Figure 6.10 reports the value of the < ADChl > before and
after the correction for the εeffxt . In Figure 6.11, the measurement of the PDE with
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the two methods is reported. The results from the two methods are compatible when
the correction for the stochastic effects is taken into account.
Fig. 6.10: The < ADChl > mean value as function of Vov before and after the εeffxt correc-
tion.
Fig. 6.11: PDE evaluated with the two above mentioned procedures.
6.2 Light - Energy Calibration
Once the ADC/Photoelectron conversion factor is known, namely the ∆pp, it is
possible to proceed to measure the conversion factor Photo-electrons/Energy in the
EJ-276 scintillator for the different Vov. The scintillator used in this measurement is
a sample of 8x8x15mm3 volume wrapped with a reflective coating (Figure 6.12). It
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was interfaced to the SiPM through optical grease and the signal form the SiPM was
directly digitised by the DT5720 CAEN digitiser. The EJ-276 has the same temporal
characteristics of the EJ-299/34, but it results in improved mechanical robustness
and optical stability in time. After the energy calibration γ sources for each Vov, it
will be possible to convert the ADC channel to photo-electrons (via ADC-Photons
calibration factor ∆directpp ) and so far the energy in photo-electrons, to measure the
number of photo-electrons per keVee for any tested Vov.
Fig. 6.12: The EJ-276 8x8x15mm3 volume wrapped with reflective coating used for the
measurement.
Different γ sources were employed: 137Cs, 22Na and a 60Co spectra were collected
integrating offline the signal digitised with DT5720 digitiser. The integration gate
was set to 800ns in order to collect 95% of the light for a γ pulse.
An exemplary spectra obtained with the 137Cs source is reported in Figure 6.13,
while in Figure 6.14 the calibration curves ADC-keV and Photoelectrons-keV are
reported for different Vov.
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Fig. 6.13: Spectrum of 137Cs source collected integrating for 800ns a the EJ-276 light read
by the SiPM biased at +3Vov
The calibration curves were measured for all the overvoltages ranging from +1Vov
to +5.5Vov.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 6.14: Calibration curves measured with a linear curve when the Compton edge position
is evaluated in ADC channels (a) or in photo electrons (b) after the correction for
εeffxt .
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6.3 F.o.M.as function of detected light
F.o.M.(E)could be now related to the number of photo-electrons in order to measure
the influence of detected light intensity.
6.3.1 FOM as function of Energy
The distribution of PSD discriminating variable as function of energy, biasing the
sensor at Vov = +3V , is reported in Figure 6.15, and the PSD distribution evaluated
for pulses with E ∈ [200; 300]keV ee and in E ∈ [1; 1.5]MeV ee are reported in
Figure 6.16 as example. The optimal integration windows have been evaluated
through the optimisation procedure presented in Chapter 4.
Fig. 6.15: PSD vs Energy Scatter Plot for the dataset at Vov = +3V
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(a) (b)
Fig. 6.16: PSD distribution in the energy bins [200; 300]keV ee (a) and [1; 1.5]MeV ee (b)
To measure the minimum discrimination energy avoiding the arbitrary choice of the
energy threshold, the F.o.M.(E)was evaluated in energy bins of 100 keVee from 50
to 950 keV. For signal higher than that the energy interval was doubled every step
to compensate for the loss of statistics; moreover the curves are relatively flat in
that region. In Figure 6.17 two curves F.o.M.(E)are reported for Vov = +2V and
Vov = +5V . The F.o.M.(E)curve was fitted with the Equation 6.10.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6.17: Upper row shows the PSD distribution for Vov = +2V (a) and for Vov = +5.5V
(b), while the bottom row show the respective F.o.M.(E)at Vov = +2V (c), and
Vov = +5.5V (d)
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By inverting the Equation 6.10 we obtain the E(F.o.M.) as in Equation 6.11.








6.3.2 Number of photons corresponding to the Emin
The effect of a different F.o.M.with different bias voltages, so far with different
PDE, is reflected in the minimum discrimination energy that is not constant with the
bias. It is possible to evaluate the number of photons corresponding to EminVov, as
reported in Figure 6.18, utilising calibration curve Figure 6.14(b).
Fig. 6.18: Minimim energy for a F.o.M.(E)≥ 1.27 as function of Vov
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Fig. 6.19: Number of photoelectrons that correspond to the Emin for all the datasets (from
Vov = +1.25 to Vov = +5.25)
The number of minimum photo-electrons appears to be constant irrespectively from
the Vov, as reported in Figure 6.19, confirming that the light collection efficiency
affects the PSD more than the stochastic effects of the SiPM. Moreover, the initial
hypothesis for the degradation of the information related to lower collected light was
measured to be consistent. This result explains the reason why the F.o.M.depends
on the deposited energy, and it shows a procedure to define the minimum number
of a photon necessary to discriminate among the impinging particles, producing a
physical model underneath the lower limit Emin in pulse shape discrimination.
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7Digital Signal Processing
In this chapter, the focus is about the performances of a digital-based acquisition
method. In the first set of measurements, the signal from EJ-276 scintillator whose
light has been collected with an array of SiPM was digitised for offline analysis.
Worth noting that the EJ-276 is the latest release by Eljen technologies, replacing
the EJ-299-34 material with improved mechanical properties and optical stability
Digital processing follows the signal sampling, and the impact of the rate and the
number of bits for every sample was investigated. Minimal requirements steered
the development of a customised, mobile, hand-held system, an evolution of the
I-Spector by Nuclear Instruments. The qualification of the device, designed in
cooperation with AWE, is reported in the final sections of the chapter.
7.1 Influence of signal shaping in PSD
Signals generated by a SiPM array (s133360-3050C), made out of 16 channels,
3x3mm3 each, arranged in a square) biased at 55 V (≈ 4Vov) were shaped with
different Front End Electronics (Figure 7.1). The signal was recorded using the
DT5720 module by CAEN, the same used in the previous chapters.
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Fig. 7.1: Experimental Set up used to test different FEE. The scintillator is coupled to the
SiPM mounted on a first-tier with connectors to adapt the SiPM input/output to a
different board. The tear in the middle comprises the FEE and gives the output,
while the bottom tier is the one embedding a small HV USB-controlled unit (cXXX
by Hamamatsu) to bias the sensor.
The two schematics considered are sketched in Figure 7.2. Option A is quite simple
but allows no control on the signal shape which depends on the SiPM parameters
(e.g. the quenching resistor and the sensor capacitance). Besides, if more SiPM are
connected in parallel, it may be expected that:
1. the output becomes longer due to the increased capacitance, scaling with the
number of SiPM;
2. differences among the single sensor electrical parameters may unbalance the
different branches;
3. the output is influenced by external load resistors used to read out the signal.
Fig. 7.2: The two Front End schematics implemented to study the impact of the signal
shaping on the Pulse Shape Discrimination
7.1 Influence of signal shaping in PSD 117
For this reason, a different design was also considered, more robust and possibly
providing equally good performance, here shown as Option B. This scheme uses
a voltage divider connecting the output of each SiPM to the virtual ground of the
amplifier to match the dynamic range and stabilise each branch independently.
At the same time, the feedback loop acts on the shape of the summed signal. A
Cadence simulation implementing a standard electrical circuit for SiPM as reported
in Chapter 3 was used to optimise the values of the circuit components. According
to the simulation, it was decided to explore two setting options that allow getting a
fast and slow response.
The response to a light burst has measured for different set-up and time signal
development, defined as the time in which signal goes for 95% to 5% of the peak
amplitude, was measured.
Fig. 7.3: Average of the response of SiPM with different FEE to a sub ns light pulse [109].
As an additional qualifier, the spectra of 137Cs source were collected by a CsI(Tl),
10x10x15mm3 volume. The spectra collected with Option B, slow configuration, is
reported in Figure 7.4. After the energy calibration, the noise of the tree front end
was evaluated as the variance of empty signals converted in keV, and it is reported
in Table 7.1 along with the conversion parameter ADC/keV .
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Fig. 7.4: Spectrum of a 137Cs γ source collected with a CsI(Tl) crystal 10 x 10 x 15 mm3
interfaced to the array of SiPM and readout by the FEE board OptionB in slow
configuration
Option A Slow Fast
ADC/keV 336 ± 12 588 ± 15 165 ± 7
σ (keV) 1.42 ± 0.05 1.53 ± 0.05 4.9 ± 0.2
∆E/E % 5.11 ± 0.03 5.01 ± 0.03 5.72 ± 0.04
Tab. 7.1: Energy calibration measured with the CsI(Tl) 10x10x15 mm3, system noise and
energy resolution at 662 keV.
A PSD vs energy plot is reported in Figure 7.5 for the Option B with the slower
shaping time, while the F.o.M.in 1-1.5 MeV energy range are reported in Table 7.2.
7.1 Influence of signal shaping in PSD 119
Fig. 7.5: PSD vs Energy measured with an EJ-299/34 coupled with a SiPM read out by a
FEE in Configuration B/Slow [109]
It was observed that the signal shaping has a non-negligible impact on the Pulse
Shape discrimination as outlined from the comparison of the F.o.M.(E)(E ∈
[1; 1.5]MeV ee) shown Table 7.2.
Configuration A B/Slow B/Fast
F.o.M. 2.47 ± 0.1 2.61 ± 0.1 2.28 ± 0.1
Tab. 7.2: F.o.M.(E)with E in 1 − 1.5MeV for the tree tested FEE configuration [109].
7.2 Digitiser performances influence on PSD
To show the impact of the digitiser performances on the deliverable device, the
Option A schematic is used hereafter as front end electronics since, as demonstrated
by the end of the chapter, it provides the best results; the signal from the 16 channel
array coupled to the EJ-276 scintillator was digitised by a DT5730 CAEN module, a
500Msps, 14Bit resolution 2V input range digitiser.
The detailed response to a light burst is reported in Figure 7.6 after the sensor was
biased at 55.5V and illuminated by a blue light generated by the PicoQuant-PDL800
LED driver, conveyed on the sensor with an optical fibre.
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Fig. 7.6: SiPM array response to a light stimulus.
Concerning the measurements with the single sensor presented in the previous
chapter, the longer decay time, given by the higher capacitance of the whole sensor,
is expected to spoil the signal degrading the PSD. In contrast, the larger area sensor
collects more light, and this is expected to increase the F.o.M.. It is not trivial to
determine which effect matter the most, and if the F.o.M.is retained as a figure of
full system capability, it is clear that collecting more light has a more significant
impact.
7.2.1 Pulse Shape Discrimination
The EJ-276 was coupled to the array, and it was exposed to γ sources to provide
the energy calibration. A 252Cf source, as shown in Figure 7.7, was used as a mixed
γ-neutron source. The sensor was based at 55.5V , and the signal was digitised
collecting more than 105 events per each source.
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Fig. 7.7: EJ 276 scintillators is coupled to the SiPM array and exposed to a 252Cf source
The Spectra of 137Cs is reported in Figure 7.8, along with the calibration curve whose
parameters are reported in Table 7.3.
ADC = kev · m + q
m 185.5 ± 0.41
q 4706.8 ± 45.94
Tab. 7.3: Fit parameters of the calibration curve in Figure 7.8
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 7.8: Experimental spectrum of 137Cs source collected with the EJ-276 scintillators (a)
and the calibration curve for the same set-up.
Following the optimisation procedure applied in the Section 4.2.2, whose output
is shown in Figure 7.9, the optimal parameters for the integration windows are
tdelay = 600ns and tint = 3µs. These integration gates reflect the longer signal
shaping, showing that there is a predominance of the SiPM response concerning the
scintillator natural decay time.
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Fig. 7.9: Heat Map of the F.o.M.as function of different gate integration boundaries
The PSD vs Energy in this condition is reported in Figure 7.10(a), and from that
distribution it is possible measure a F.o.M.(E = ∞) equal to 3.47 ± 0.41 as reported
in Figure 7.10(b) and an Emin = 186.5 ± 25.3keV e.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 7.10: The PSD parameter distribution as function of Energy (a) and the F.o.M.(E)(b)
7.2.2 Sampling Frequency effect
The impact of sampling rate was assessed sub-sampling offline the original waveform
(500msps) to 250 and 100 Msps. The optimisation procedure identified the same
time limits for the tail integration gate, tdelay = 600ns and tint = 3µs irrespectively
from the sampling rate.
7.2 Digitiser performances influence on PSD 125
The three datasets give excellent and similar results as all of the measured F.o.M.(E)at
E = ∞ are statistically compatible.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7.11: F.o.M.(E)for the 500 (a) and 50 (b) Msps set-up. The sampling rate does affect
the F.o.M.and the Emin when the sampling rate is reduced by a factor 10.
Fig. 7.12: Comparison between the F.o.M.(E = ∞) and the Emin for different sampling
rate
7.2.3 Bit Resolution Effect
The impact of the bit resolution was measured applying a bit-shift of 2 or 4 bits to
the original dataset sampled at 500 Msps and 14-bit resolution.
In this case, the F.o.M.(E)and Emin from dataset at 14 and 12 bits resolution are
compatible, while the degradation of the information when the dataset is reduced
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to a resolution of 10 bits is non-negligible. Indeed in this case the Emin = 482.88 ±
68.24keV ee ad the F.o.M.(E)for E = ∞ is 2.09 ± 0.16.
The dataset was de-sampled at 100Msps and ten-bit resolution. It was found that,
irrespectively from the sampling rate, the F.o.M.(E)at E > 1MeV ee is lower than
2.1 as reported in Figure 7.13.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7.13: The four panels shows the different F.o.M.(E)for different sampling-resolution
combination: (a) 500Msps / 12 bit (b) 500 Msps / 10 bit (c) 100Msps/14 Bit (d)
100 Msps / 10 bits.
Figure 7.14 reports the values of the F.o.M.(E)for E = ∞, and the Emin for the
different bit resolution. In the plot the qualifiers values obtained at 10 bits and 500
Msps is reported, to be comparable with the 12 and 14 bits datasets.
From those set of measurements, the bit resolution as an impact on the Pulse Shape
Discrimination. In fact, since the noise RMS2 is about 5mV , and the least significant
bit introduce an error of 0.12 or 0.48 mV, for the 14 and 12 bits respectively, when
the bit resolution is 10 bits least significant bit corresponds to 1.9mV .
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Fig. 7.14: Results of F.o.M.(E)and Emin in the bit scan
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7.3 A system prototype based on a fully digital
approach
The requirements for a custom re-design of a pre-existing device (I-Spector, com-
mercialised by CAEN spa and designed by Nuclear Instruments SRL [110]) were
set after the results obtained in the previous section. The customisation consists
in the replacement of an MCA used for the γ spectroscopy with a digitiser. The
on-line Pulse Shape Discrimination was implemented in FPGA with the Peak-Tail
algorithm (Equation 2.8). This instrument is going to be a light-weight detector for
neutron/γ discrimination in real-time for diffuse monitor applications. There are
nonetheless fundamental differences in the instrument concerning the laboratory
system presented in the first half of this chapter.
Fig. 7.15: Electrical scheme of the I-Spector Front End
First of all, the I-Spector embeds 4 SiPM 6x6mm2 each arranged in a two by two
square matrix, that belongs to the s14161-6050HS series, whose main features are
reported in Table 7.4. The scheme of front end electronics is reported in Figure 7.15.
The analogue output allows us to read the signal and to process it offline for further
qualification. The digitiser has 12 bits resolution over 2V input range with a sampling
rate of 250Msps. As shown in previous section 12 bits were required to collect enough
information to perform PSD, while in principle 100Msps would have been sufficient.
The choice to have 250Msps was driven by practical consideration on the design;
in fact, the chosen ADC family used has the same pinout for the 250 or the 100
Msps, and the power dissipation of the device would have been, in both cases, below
≈ 3.5W .
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s14161-6050HS
Number of SiPM 4
Single SiPM Size 6 x x mm2
Pixel Pitch 50 µm
Vbd 39.5 V
Vop Vbd + 2V V




Fill Factor 74 %
Tab. 7.4: Main characteristics of the sensors mounted on the I-Spector
In the deliverable for AWE, the chosen scintillator was a sample of EJ-276 with
10x10x50mm3 volume wrapped with Teflon, as shown in Figure 7.16.
Fig. 7.16: The EJ-276 sample with dimension 10x10x50mm3.
The I-Spector embeds a micro-controller:
• processes data from the FPGA;
• hosts the web-server for the communication with the instrument;
• manages the ethernet communication and the HV module.
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Moreover, it embeds a LORA antenna for remote long-range data transmission. The
Instrument in Figure 7.17 is 11cm long with a diameter of 5cm, and it weighs 300g.
An FPGA apply the Pulse Shape Discrimination to digitised waveforms. Via software
alarms can be set when different levels of radiation are measured, and the alert
can be sent via embedded antenna for LORA protocol-based communications or the
entire spectra. Alarm history can be stored into a cloud via ethernet connection.
Fig. 7.17: The customised I-Spector device.
It is then necessary to qualify this system against the reference results obtained in
Section 7.2.1 to evaluate the impact of the different front end on the PSD. In the
first place, instrument response to a light signal, collected by illuminating the sensor
with a PicoQuant PDL-800, was measured and the results reported in the dedicated
following sub-section. The performances of the bigger scintillator coupled to the
I-Spector were measured by externally digitising the signal with the CAEN DT5730.
The experimental set-up realisation is shown in Figure 7.18 where the I-Spector
were placed in a light-tight box, and it was possible to illuminate it with a light burst
to measure the time development of the signal, and then to be coupled with the
EJ-276 scintillator for the γ/neutron discrimination measurements.
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Fig. 7.18: The I-Spector mounted in a light-tight box for the measurements with light and
with the EJ-276.
7.3.1 I-Spector Off-line Qualification
7.3.2 response to a light signal
Light from PicoQuant PDL-800 is conveyed to the SiPM, biased at 41.4V, Vov = +2V ,
surface with an optical fibre. The fibre is half a centimetre away from the centre
of the surface to equally illuminates the 4 SiPMs. In Figure 7.19 the response to
the light burst is shown, where the temporal development is shorter than the one
from the electronic used in the previous section. The capacitance of those SiPM is
higher than the S13 series, so far a shaping circuit is required to shorten the signals
(Table 7.5) This is the reason why both the τ and the ∆95−5% are shorter than the
ones presented in Section 7.2.1 even if the total capacitance of the s13361-3050CS
is lower with respect to the s14161-6050HS one (Figure 7.19).
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Fig. 7.19: I-Spector response to light burst
s13360 I-Spector
τ 453.52 ± 3.71ns 1332 ns
∆95−5 4.12362.32± ns 1054 ns
Tab. 7.5: Comparison of the time development of the signal for the two arrays
7.3.3 Pulse Shape Discrimination
The energy calibration has been performed integrating offline the signals for 2µs,
and the calibration curve is reported in Figure 7.20.
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Fig. 7.20: The calibration curve obtained with a 137Cs,22Na and a 60Co sources
Then the system was exposed to the 252Cf and optimisation procedure was applied;
the output is shown in Figure 7.21.
In order to compare the I-Spector front end electronics performance, analogue
output was digitised with the DT5730, and the optimisation procedure defined the
integration time boundaries that would then have been set on the I-Spector for the
on-line analysis.
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Fig. 7.21: Heat-Map as result of the optimisation procedure on the analogue output of the
I-Spector.
The PSD vs Energy plot, where the PSDP T was obtained with the integration
boundaries found by the optimisation procedure, tdelay = 300ns and tint = 1.5µs,is
reported in Figure 7.22 and the F.o.M.(E)shown in Figure 7.23.
Fig. 7.22: PSD vs Energy scatter plot
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Fig. 7.23: F.o.M.(E)shows both a lower E(F.o.M. = 1.27) and E(F.o.M. = ∞)
7.3.4 I-Spector On-line analysis qualification
The I-Spector host a web server that can be reached via ethernet connection, and from
a web-page based software it is possible to access to the system configuration and
settings and to perform the γ/neutron measurements. The configuration tab allows
setting HV and the parameters for the temperature compensation (Figure 7.24(a)).
A Log page shows the time series of HV, temperature and current of the sensor.
The MCA tab shows the spectra and allows to perform the energy calibration fitting
either the peak value with a gaussian function, and the Compton Edges with a
complementary erf (Figure 7.24(b)). PSD tab shows both the PSD vs Energy plot as a
2D histogram allowing to evaluate the F.o.M.within user-defined energy boundaries
(Figure 7.25(a)). The software saves the spectra, the PSD vs Energy 2D histogram for
offline analysis and it also allows to dump on file the digitised waveforms for further
offline analysis and data validation. Moreover, from the same software interface, it is
possible to set Regions Of Interest (ROI) for the alarms, either related γ or neutron
pulses(Figure 7.25(b)).
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(a) I-Spector Monitor tab
(b) MCA tab from where it is possible to calibrate the system
Fig. 7.24: Some screenshot of the I-Spector custom software for the on-line PSD analysis.
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(a) PSD and F.o.M.tab
(b) ROI and alarm setting tab
Fig. 7.25: Some screenshot of the I-Spector custom software for the on-line PSD analysis.
7.3.5 On-Line PSD Software
The On-line calibration curve was verified by analysing offline the spectra and values
within the error was found for the two curve parameters, as reported in Table 7.6
ADC = kev · m + q
m 0.37 ± 0.02
q 23.13 ± 7.24
Tab. 7.6: Calibratio of the I-Spector with EJ-276 scintillator.
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An analysis of the collected data was performed offline to validate the results of the
on-line procedure, a. It results worst concerning the one obtained by digitising the
analogue output since the Emin = 445.98±86.69 and the F.o.M.(E ∈ [1.5; 2]MeV ) =
2.6. The reason for the worst performances is related to the bin resolution in the
FPGA when the PSD values are binned in the 2D histogram. Due to the limited
memory, the binning produces PSD distribution to be mapped in no more than 5/6
bins, affecting the quality of the gaussian fit and resulting in higher errors. So far, the
F.o.M.(E)plot is not entirely reliable, even if it gives a good indication and allows
for sufficient discrimination in the reference energy window.
The I-Spector showed very satisfactory performances, allowing to achieve a rejection
rate at the level 10−6 due to statistical fluctuation since the FOM is measured as 2.2
in E ∈ [1; 1.5]MeV . Moreover, it embeds advanced functionalities, from the on-line
F.o.M.evaluation to the on-line calibration, the possibility to set alarms according
to the measured rate in a given energy or PSD range, and to send alarms via LORA
protocol. To conclude, a cloud service allows to remotely collect data from the
I-Spector, even in a multi-device installation when they are configured in geo-tagged
smart grids.
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8Analogue Signal Processing
Pulse Shape Discrimination performed with fully analogue systems is the last step in
this works. The measurements rely on an ASIC designed by Kromek Group p.l.c and
called APOLLO. Indeed, the ASIC is a multi-purpose platform, highly configurable,
that is suitable for both low light measurement with SiPM, γ spectroscopy and Pulse
Shape discrimination. For each of its 16 channels, it is possible to either integrate
the signal (within a user-defined integration gate) or measure the peak amplitude.-
The ASIC was just delivered from the production, so far the first half of the chapter
presents a description of the instruments and the electronic characterisation. A set of
measurements were performed to define its operational parameter. γ spectroscopy
measurements were also performed to complete the qualification. Two crystals were
used for the study on Pulse Shape Discrimination: the organic scintillator EJ-276
readout with the Front End presented in the previous chapters and the CLLB-C crystal
in a configuration delivered by Kromek with dedicated SiPM and electronics.
8.1 The Apollo ASIC
The Apollo ASIC has 16 analogue input channels and a single digital output on an
SPI port. For each channel, the analogue block (Figure 8.1) comprises a pre-amplifier,
a shaping amplifier, a leading-edge threshold comparator, an analogue integrator
and a peak detector. Analogue integrator and peak detector amplitude are digitised
inside the ASIC over 12 bits sent over an SPI protocol to an external micro-controller.
Operational parameters of the channels, e.g. the threshold level, the gain, the peak-
ing time of the shaping amplifier, the integration time window and the peak detector
track and hold window, are software-defined by the user. The main functionalities
that the Apollo ASIC embeds are:
• pre-amplifier: voltage amplifier with a variable gain that can be set to
3,6,9,12,24 and 32x;
• Semi-Gaussian Shaper: this shaping circuit is a standard CR-RC shaper with
a single τ that can be set ranging from 0.5 to 15 µs, resulting in a peaking
time that ranges from 1 to 32 µs. It should be bypassed (with a proper ASIC
configuration) to preserve the native signal shape for PSD application;
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• Threshold comparator: a leading-edge discriminator logic that produces both
the trigger for the readout and a timestamp for each triggered event with 8ns
granularity;
• Analogue integrator: integration gate ranges from 100ns to 10µs with a step
of 8 ns. It also has an internal amplification that adapts the input signal to the
internal circuits to explore all the available output dynamic range at different
integration gates.
• Peak detector: peak and hold circuits that can hold the peak up to 32 µs to
cope with the longest peaking time of the Semi-Gaussian Shaper.
• Digital and Communication block: a 12-bit digitiser is embedded in the ASIC
and read either the Analogue Integrator or the Peak Detector. An SPI port
may transfer the digitised information and time stamp to the processing unit
that, could be either an external device or a microprocessor embedded in an
instrument for the analysis.
Fig. 8.1: APOLLO ASIC logic blocks
The 16 channel are grouped in groups of 4 that can share a common trigger. The
trigger can be shared from one of the four channels to the other three by a leading-
edge discriminator. Different channels and trigger scheme have been used to fit the
measurements need, namely:
• Measurements with a light pulse: Channel 0 was used as a trigger, and the
SiPM signal was recorded on Channel 1.
• γ Spectroscopy and PSD: Channel 0 was configured to trigger on the leading
edge of the signal. Channels 1 and 2 were used as the analogue integrator/peak
detector since the PSDP T algorithm das been chosen.
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8.1.1 Functionality characterisation
The range of the threshold comparator, the analogue integrator and the peak detector
was measured, then the transfer function of the pre-amplifier and the Semi-Gaussian
Shaper have been evaluated since, as it has been shown in Chapter 4 shaping has a
non-negligible influence on PSD.
Fig. 8.2: APOLLO ASIC test board
The characterisation was carried out using the test board for the APOLLO ASIC
developed by Kromek Group plc, ( Figure 8.2 - a ). The board individually address
inputs channels of the ASIC, and it embeds a microcontroller that reads the SPI port,
a USB-C port for the configuration and the readout of the ASIC digital output by
dedicated software, an HV module for the SiPM biasing and a pulse generator for
functionalities testing. The initial tests were carried out configuring the ASIC with
the lowest gain of the pre-amplifier (3x) and bypassing the Semi-Gaussian Shaper.
An external signal generator was used to generate different signal level, and signal
length for the qualification of the ASIC working range measuring amplitude directly
and signal length.
8.1.2 Threshold calibration
The threshold level can be set individually for each channel with a maximum excur-
sion of +25mV above a common threshold value equal for all the channels. On the
ASIC the common threshold value is set in steps of 25mV, while the individual chan-
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nel setting has a granularity of 0.1 mV. a A squared signal high level was increased
from a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 200 mV in steps of 0.1mV to calibrate the
threshold and evaluate its linearity range. For each value, the corresponding ADC
value set on the ASIC that guarantee at least 50% of pulses to generate a trigger was
identified as the value in ADC of the threshold corresponding to the squared signal
amplitude. The threshold comparator is downstream to the pre-amplifier, so far, the
voltage range in which the Threshold Calibration was performed was 15-800 mV.
Fig. 8.3: Calibration curve for the threshold comparator.
The response of the threshold comparator is linear, with a residual non-linearity
below 8%, where the maximum discrepancy occurs at the coarse steps changes of
the shared value, as shown in Figure 8.3.
8.1.3 Peak Detector
A trapezoidal signal (50ns long high level and 20ns rise time) was increased between
5 mV and 800mV, to qualify the Peak Detector, namely 15-2400 mV taking into
account the 3x gain by the Pre-Amplifier. The response of the peak detector is linear
was measured to be linear up to 700mV with a residual non-linearity below 0.2%.
For signals higher than 700mV, it deviates from linearity up to the saturation point
at 2V, as shown in Figure 8.4.
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Fig. 8.4: Response of the Peak Detector
8.1.4 Analogue Integrator
The linearity of the integrator has been measured with respect to the variation of
the input level and the signal duration. In particular, the difference in time duration
will assess the linearity of the integration circuit, while the amplitude variation will
test the response of the internal amplification stage. The first step was performed
with a fixed integration gate of 10µs, and the different signal durations ranged from
200ns to 10 µs. The measurement was repeated with three signal of 150, 450 and
750 mV. As shown in Figure 8.5, the response is linear in the whole tested range,
with a residual non-linearity below 0.5%. In Figure 8.5 the x-axes report the area
under the signal, proportional to the charge collected by the integrator, corrected by
the internal gain of the analogue integrator.
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Fig. 8.5: Response of the analogue integrator to a time-varying signal
On the other hand, the response of the analogue integrator to a varying amplitude
signal was investigated with a signal that covers in amplitude the same dynamic
range used for the Peak Detector. Indeed, to collect the same amount of charge
for the time linearity measurement, the signal length was set to 500ns and the
integration gate to 2µs.
8.1 The Apollo ASIC 145
Fig. 8.6: Response of the analogue integrator to a signal-level varying signal
As shown in Figure 8.3, a quadratic curve well fits the up to 5 mv · t[ns], that
corresponds to about 1V signal amplitude at analogue integrator input (to be cor-
rected for the 0.88x internal gain), with residuals that non exceed 0.5%, showing
a non-linearity of the internal amplification stage. For signal up to 7 mv · t[ns]
(≈ 1.5V ) the deviation from the ideal curve is, as expected, negative. Then the
signal became comparable with analogue integrator power rails causing a drastic
change in component behaviour resulting in the excess respect to the quadratic
curve.
8.1.5 Transfer Function
The light generated by the LED Driver PicoQuant PDL800 is conveyed on the HPK
SiPM array (s13360-3050C), and the signal shape was retrieved with the following
procedure: the signal was integrated at different time windows, measuring Q(t),
the collected charge as a function of time as reported in Figure 8.7; the numerical
derivative of Q(t) was calculated, and it returned the signal shape at the input of
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Fig. 8.7: SiPM response to an ultra-fast light pulse with superimposed Q(t)
The signal shape after the pre-amplification, shown in Figure 8.8, present a decay
time of 458.15ns ±0.85ns, reasonably similar to the actual response of the SiPM
array (454.42ns ± 0.72ns) obtained by directly digitising the SiPM array output
with an Oscilloscope. The pre-amplifier thus does not affect the signal shape, so far
good pulse shape discrimination results are expected.
Fig. 8.8: Plot of the numerical derivative of Q(t), representing the average signal after the
pre-amplification stage
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The same procedure was applied to measure the response of the Semi-Gaussian
Shaper, that can be used in γ spectroscopy. In Figure 8.9 signal shapes after the
shaping with 1µs and 2µs peaking time are reported. Moreover, the area under
the two curves, proportional to the signal integral, is the same, confirming that the
Semi-Gaussian Shaper does not affect the total collected charge from signals.
Fig. 8.9: The numerical derivative of Q(t) after the Semi Gaussian Shaper for two different
peaking time.
8.2 γ spectroscopy qualification
The qualification of the ASIC spectroscopic performance was achieved acquiring γ
spectra with CsI(Tl) crystal (10x10x15mm3) coupled to the SiPM array. The signal
was either integrated for 10µs or shaped with 16 µs peaking time and the peak value
captured by the peak detector. As expected from the electronics characterisation,
the energy calibration curve for the analogue integrator is quadratic, with the main
parameter of the fit shown in Figure 8.10(a) that are reported in Table 8.1. In
contrast, the calibration curve for the peak detector is linear, as shown in Figure
8.10(b), and fit parameter are also reported in Table 8.1.
Parameter Integrator Semi-Gaussian
Quadratic Term −9.83 · 10−5 ± 0.78 · 10−5 N.A.
Linear Term 1.31 ± 0.012 0.94 ± 0.07
Offset 116.9 ± 3.8 164.5 ± 17.5
Tab. 8.1: Calibration curves fitting parameters
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(a) (b)
Fig. 8.10: Calibration curve for the Analogue Integrator (a) and for the Peak Detector after
the Semi-Gaussian Shaper (b).
In Figure 8.11 137Cs spectra acquired with the two approaches are shown, and in
Table 8.2 the resolutions of the 662 keV peak are reported. The resolution obtained
with the integral based spectrum is 5.71%, close to the intrinsic resolution of the
crystal (≈ 5%)
Fig. 8.11: Spectra of a 137Cs source collected with the APOLLO ASIC with either retaining
the integral or the peak amplitude after the Semi-Gaussian Shaper
It is sensible that the ballistic deficit could be non-negligible because the shaping
time of the Semi-Gaussian Shaper is comparable with the signal length [47], so
far this explains the worst resolution of the measurements performed with the
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Semi-Gaussian shaper in respect to the one obtained with the integral. In this
configuration, the consideration from Chapter 5 does not hold since the peaking
time is long enough to collect all photons from the scintillator.
It is then worth to measure the γ spectra with the peak detector without any shaping.
The results are shown in Figure 8.12, where the 137 spectrum obtained with the
analogue integrator is shown superimposed to the one obtained retaining the peak
amplitude. As expected, the resolution worsens, being 5.71 ± 0.02% for the integral
while it is only 8.35 ± 0.02%. This result is consistent with what was measured in
Chapter 5: retaining the peak amplitude form signal generated by a scintillator with
a long decay time is not the optimal solution to measure γ spectra.
Fig. 8.12: Spectra of a 137Cs source collected with the APOLLO ASIC with either retaining
the integral or the peak amplitude with no signal shaping.
Tab. 8.2: Resolutions of the 662 keV peak of a 137Cs, collected with tree different configura-
tions
∆E/E 137Cs
Analogue Integrator 5.71% ± 0.02%
Semi-Gaussian Shaper 6.82% ± 0.03%
Peak Amplitude 8.35 ± 0.02
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8.3 γ-neutron discrimination with Apollo ASIC
The qualification of the ASIC for γ-neutron discrimination application was made
either using the EJ-276 scintillator (8x8x15mm3 volume) or the CLLB-C organic
scintillator (2 inches diameter cylinder, 10cm height) coupled to the SiPM Array
exposed to a 252Cf source and several γ calibration sources.
8.3.1 EJ-276
8.3.2 Energy Calibration
Due to the low Z of the scintillating material, the energy calibration relied on the
use of the Compton Edge position of the spectra, acquired integrating for 4µs signals
from the γ calibration sources (137Cs, 22Na and 60Co). The Compton edge positions
were determined after a fit with a complementary error function (erfc(x)) on the
Compton’s shoulder, as shown in Figure 8.13, where the fit is superimposed to 137Cs
spectra [111].
Fig. 8.13: The spectra of 137Cs source obtained with the EJ-276 coupled with the SiPM
array whose signal was processed by the APOLLO ASIC
The calibration curve is shown in Figure 8.14, where a quadratic function, whose
parameters are reported in Table 8.3, was again used to account for integrator
non-linearity.
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Fig. 8.14: Calibration Curve of the system. A second order polynomial was used to fit the
data in order to account for the analogue integrator non linearity
Tab. 8.3: Calibration Curve fitting parameters
EJ-276 Energy Calibration
Quadratic term (3.1 ± 0.5) · 10−4
Linear Term 0.67 ± 0.3
Offset −18.5 ± 38.3
8.3.3 Pulse Shape Discrimination
In order to evaluate the PSD discriminating variable according to the Equation 2.8,
the signal was simultaneously connected to 3 channels of the ASIC: the first one
used to retain the energy information integrating the signal for 4µs and propagate
the trigger, the second channel was configured to retain the peak amplitude, and
the third one integrates the tail of the signal. The integration limits were the one
found in the optimisation procedure with the digital set-up presented in Chapter 7
(tdelay = 600ns,tint = 3000ns).
In Figure 8.15 the PSD parameter is plotted versus the energy for the 252Cf neutron
source (6 kBq) and for the 60Co and 137Cs γ sources.
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Fig. 8.15: PSD parameter vs Energy deposited in the scintillator in units of electron equiva-
lent keV.
In Figure 8.16 is reported the distribution for the energy windows between 1 and
1.5 MeV where the F.o.M.was measured to be 3.76 ± 0.34. The centroids and the
FWHM were obtained again with a double Gaussian fit on the PSD distribution.
Fig. 8.16: F.o.M. from the PSD distribution in the energy slice 1-1.5 MeV
8.3 γ-neutron discrimination with Apollo ASIC 153
In Figure 8.17 the F.o.M.(E)is shown. It was evaluated for non-overlapping energy
bins (100 keV) from 50 keV to 1 MeV plus one more bin for energies between 1 and
2.2 MeV.
Fig. 8.17: F.o.M. as function of energy.
ASIC results to be better concerning the digital system a F.o.M.(E = ∞), is equal to
3.75±0.05 should be compared with 3.47±0.04, and a slightly better Emin, equal to
120.71 ± 5.18keV with the ASIC, to be compared with 186.5 ± 25.3keV .
8.3.4 CLLB-C
The high Z of the CLLB-C scintillator allows getting an energy calibration curve
relying on the photo-peak positions. The excellent γ spectroscopy capability of this
crystal was confirmed by the high quality γ spectra, for example, the 137Cs shown
in Figure 8.18. The ∆E/E for the 662 keV photo-peak is 4.2% ± 0.2%, with an
intrinsic resolution of 3.5%.
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Fig. 8.18: 137Cs spectra collected with the CLLB-C crystal
Thermal neutrons used in PSD capability assessment with the CLLB-C were obtained
shielding a 252Cf source with a cylinder of PVT with 10cm of diameter. PSDP T
parameter was evaluated, and event by event value vs pulse energy is plotted in
Figure 8.19.
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(a) PSD parameter vs Energy for the 252Cf source obtained with the CLLB-C crystal
(b) F.o.M. shows a good separation between γ and neutrons, even though the
self activity of the CLLB-C is quite evident
Fig. 8.19
In Figure 8.19(a) the discrete structures in the low energy region of the scatter plot
are due to the digitisation of the peak amplitude and the integral tail spectrum in
4096 channels.
8.3 γ-neutron discrimination with Apollo ASIC 156
γ-neutron separation is excellent, with a F.o.M. of 4.29 ± 0.87 in the energy window
between 2.5 and 4 MeV, but in fact, the contamination from the α particle from
self-activity is quite evident, and it increases the false positive rate.
The background has been evaluated collecting data for 35 min (Figure 8.20) mea-
suring a self-activity rate of 0.57Hz, 0.014 Hz of which are underneath the neutron
blob.
Fig. 8.20: Self activity and background in the CLLB-C crystal measurement. The Background
was acquired for 35 min in the same condition as for the Figure 8.19
For any neutron measurement, especially for nuclear security, it is mandatory to
properly evaluate this background because it can induce a false alarm rate that
would prevent this crystal from being used successfully in an instrument.
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9Conclusions and Outlooks
The goal of the research activity described in this thesis was the developing of a
new algorithm for Pulse Shape Discrimination applied to SiPMs coupled to PSD
Capable Scintillators. In addition to that, the impact of the acquisition chain in
Pulse Shape Discrimination had been studied, and its understanding allowed to
implement this algorithm in two near-real time systems based on an ASIC and a
FPGA. The peak amplitude normalisation measurements proposed in this work are
an innovative approach to the PSD that has been studied, and the motivation for its
excellent performances have been investigated. Indeed to understand the physical
meaning of the peak amplitude a better knowledge in measurements with SiPM as
light detector either from a source like a laser or a LED suggested that it may be
possible to push the use of SiPMs in applications where a large number of photons
need to be resolved, for example, in some quantum optics applications[105, 104].
After the definition of a robust and straightforward algorithm, the impact of the
light collection efficiency was measured. The results highlighter how light collection
efficiency plays a fundamental role in PSD since the same number of detected
photons corresponds to the same F.o.M.. The use of a SiPM array allowed to collect
all the light from the EJ-276 and produced a larger F.o.M.even if signal shaping
is not negligible due to the considerably increased array capacitance. Then the
measurement of the impact of digital acquisition chain for signal processing was
performed. The gathered results allowed to build an instrument, based on an FPGA,
that was capable of on-line Pulse Shape Discrimination. One of the main results
obtained in this thesis was, indeed, the full commissioning of the custom version of
the I-Spector prototype. This instrument, highly configurable, equipped with a LORA
communication system, can be used in a diffuse monitoring system to remotely
control a large area, receiving alarms for a specific energy region of interest, either
neutron or γ related.
It was also shown that with proper electronics, it is possible to obtain good discrim-
ination even if the latest generation of the Hamamatsu SiPM has an even larger
capacitance, so a more substantial impact on the signal shape concerning the s13360
series. That is another proof that the factor with the higher impact on the F.o.M.is
the light collection efficiency.
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Concerning the research project, it was customised an instrument for on-line γ/neu-
tron detection and discrimination. The instrument was fully qualified, commissioned
and delivered to AWE. The instrument is a full-working product with dedicated
software that allows controlling the unit remotely, to calibrate the detector, set ROI
for alarms separately for neutron and γ, and with the possibility do send those
alarms via LORA protocol due to the integrated LORA antenna. The on-line pulse
shape discrimination allows to obtain separation down to Emin = 400keV and with
a F.o.M.(E = [1; 1.5MeV ]) = 2.2 ± 39).
The APOLLO ASIC developed by Kromek Group plc has been qualified for the Pulse
Shape Discrimination application. The working range of the blocks comprised in the
analogue part of the APOLLO ASIC have been tested, and the results showed, in the
first place, high-grade γ spectroscopy performances, with a 662 keV peak resolution
from a 137Cs source close to the intrinsic resolution of the CsI(Tl) crystal.
Fast neutron detection via Pulse Shape Discrimination with F.o.M. ≥ 2 for deposited
energy more than 350 keV was obtained, and a maximum of F.o.M. of 3.75 ±
0.05 was measured. Moreover, the low energy discrimination limit was found at
120.71keV ± 5.18keV .
In addition to that, APOLLO was qualified for the use with inorganic scintillator
doped with 6Li; in this scenario, the APOLLO showed itself as a useful tool, even
thermal neutron detection. Discrimination power, qualified by a F.o.M. = 4.20±
0.87 is spoiled by the self-activity of the crystal, measured to be at sub-Hertz level,
possibly limiting the use of CLLB-C crystal in the field. The results obtained in this
thesis and the algorithm developed for γ-neutron discrimination based on peak-tail
algorithm are the core of the D5 RIID produced and presented to the market by
Kromek in late 2020.
In conclusion, it is possible to build a portable detector for diffuse monitoring appli-
cations based on a single scintillator read out by a SiPM using either an analogue or
a digital approach, when all the acquisition chain blocks are accurately optimised.
A deep understanding of factors contributing to discrimination has been achieved,
but integration gates boundary origin failed to be modelled yet. In particular further
study shall indicate how those boundaries depend on noise band of electronics
circuits and the convolution of the scintillator and SiPM signal time development.
Moreover, the impact of temperature variation on the discrimination has to be
investigated to guarantee better in-field operation performances. Additionally, the
response of the scintillators, and the F.o.M.at different temperatures, should be
investigated in order to disentangle the effect of changes in light yield and in the
ratio of characteristic scintillating light time development. It seems that it is not
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possible, however, neither in literature nor in the results reported in this thesis, to
obtain acceptable discrimination below 100 keV , and it was proven that this limit is
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